Truth: explanation, success, and coincidence

Gamester, Will

doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0909-2

Cited by 23 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 10 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…He then finds the hammer in one of the two places. To explain the fact that Charles successfully gets the hammer in one of the two places, one may appeal to his true belief that the 48 See Lynch (2009, pp.111-4) and Gamester (2018) for examples.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A quasi-deflationary solution to the problems of mixed inferences and mixed compounds

Zhang

2024

Inquiry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Truth pluralism is the view that there is more than one truth property. The strong version of it (i.e. strong pluralism) further contends that no truth property is shared by all true propositions. In this paper, I help strong pluralism solve two pressing problems concerning mixed discourse: the problem of mixed inferences (PI) and the problem of mixed compounds (PC). According to PI, strong pluralism is incompatible with the truthpreservation notion of validity; according to PC, strong pluralists cannot find any appropriate truth property for mixed compound propositions, whose atomic constituents are from different domains of discourse (e.g., ). I argue that the strong pluralist is motivated to take the truth predicate in truth-involving universal statements to be deflationary to avoid the two pressing problems. Such a move entails that the truth predicate in the platitude of validity (V) for any argument, it is valid if and only if necessarily its conclusion is true when its premises are all true does not denote any substantive truth property. Instead, it is merely an expressive device to help people generalize instances of (V) to (V). Analogous stories hold for the truth predicate in the platitudes of compound (e.g., conjunction). The upshot is that, the strong pluralist can solve PI and PC by further conceding that mixed compounds are true/false in a deflationary way.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A quasi-deflationary solution to the problems of mixed inferences and mixed compounds

Zhang

2024

Inquiry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…(Though it is not clear to me that the view can be ascribed to all these authors.) Similarly, Will Gamester (2018) writes 'the deflationist has traditionally offered seductive individualised explanations that seem to leave no explanatory work for truth ' (p. 1264).…”

Section: The Deflationary Concept Of Truth and The Success Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Explanatory Power of Deflationary Truth

Bradley

2022

Erkenn

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

It is widely believed that deflationary truth has no explanatory power. I will argue that it does. Specifically, I will consider some objections to deflationary truth having explanatory power, and argue that they fail. The position which will emerge is that the deflationary concept of truth is analogous to the concept of an average. Scientists take averages to be explanatory, and I will argue that the concept of deflationary truth is explanatory in the same way. I then argue that this deflationary concept of truth motivates a theory of the property of truth which is metaphysically disunified, but that this is no obstacle to explanation. This leads to a way of understanding the deflationary/substantive distinction in terms of grounding.

show abstract

“…12. Gamester (2018) discusses this sort of strategy at length and argues that it fails even if the substitution is granted. 13.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modes of Truth

Nicolai

Stern²

2021

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The aim of this volume is to open up new perspectives and to raise new research questions about a unified approach to truth, modalities, and propositional attitudes. The volume's essays are grouped thematically around different research questions. The first theme concerns the tension between the theoretical role of the truth predicate in semantics and its expressive function in language. The second theme of the volume concerns the interaction of truth with modal and doxastic notions. The third theme covers higher-order solutions to the semantic and modal paradoxes, providing an alternative to first-order solutions embraced in the first two themes. This book will be of interest to researchers working in epistemology, logic, philosophy of logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, and semantics.

show abstract

Truth: explanation, success, and coincidence

Cited by 23 publications

References 10 publications

A quasi-deflationary solution to the problems of mixed inferences and mixed compounds

A quasi-deflationary solution to the problems of mixed inferences and mixed compounds

The Explanatory Power of Deflationary Truth

Modes of Truth

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About