Truth: One or Many or Both?

Bar‐On, Dorit; Simmons, Keith

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-98346-2_2

Cited by 17 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…12ff;1998b, p. 201), 4 I will leave this issue aside here because it lies beyond the scope of this paper and is anyway irrelevant to the points that will be made. Apart from this issue, there are two main motivations for pluralism (Asay, 2018;Bar-On & Simmons, 2018;Pedersen, 2012). 5 The first motivation stems from the so-called 'scope problem' (Edwards 2011(Edwards , 2018Lynch, 2009, ch.…”

Section: Alethic Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Alethic pluralism and truthmaker theory

Akiba

2022

Theoria

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According to alethic pluralism, sentences belonging to different domains of discourse can be true by having different alethic (i.e., truth‐constituting) properties. Against this pluralistic view, Jamin Asay has recently argued that pluralists' appeal to multiple alethic properties is ill‐motivated because the main advantages of pluralism can already be obtained within the framework of standard truthmaker theory. In response to this objection, this paper argues that Asay's claim does not hold with respect to one of the central advantages of pluralism, namely, the ability to offer a proper understanding of the realism/anti‐realism debate. This is because, first, when simply construed, truthmaker theory can only provide an inadequate understanding of the debate, and second, when construed in certain ways that allow it to avoid inadequacy, it becomes committed to multiple alethic properties.

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Section: Alethic Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For similar remarks, see Quine (1960, p. 131), Pettit (1996, p. 886), Blackburn (2013, p. 265), Dodd (2013, pp. 304f), Wrenn (2015, Bar-On &Simmons (2018, pp. 53ff), andJago (2019, p. 975).…”

Section: A Challenge Based On Truthmaker Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Alethic pluralism and truthmaker theory

Akiba

2022

Theoria

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“… 9 See Quine ( 1960 : pp. 118–119); Sainsbury ( 1996 ); Dodd ( 2013 ); Asay ( 2018 ); Bar-On and Simmons ( 2019 ). Unlike some of these presentations, I’ve tried to meet pluralists more on their own terms.…”

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confidence: 99%

Shopping for truth pluralism

Gamester

2020

Synthese

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Truth pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between domains of discourse: while ordinary descriptive claims or those of the hard sciences might be true in virtue of corresponding to reality, those concerning ethics, mathematics, institutions (or modality, aesthetics, comedy…) might be true in some non-representational or "anti-realist" sense. Despite pluralism attracting increasing amounts of attention, the motivations for the view remain underdeveloped. This paper investigates whether pluralism is well-motivated on ontological grounds: that is, on the basis that different discourses are concerned with different kinds of entities. Arguments that draw on six different ontological contrasts are examined: (i) concrete versus abstract entities; (ii) mind-independent versus mind-dependent entities; (iii) sparse versus merely abundant properties; (iv) objective versus projected entities; (v) natural versus non-natural entities; and (vi) ontological pluralism (entities that literally exist in different ways). I argue that the additional premises needed to move from such contrasts to truth pluralism are either implausible or unmotivated, often doing little more than to bifurcate the nature of truth when a more theoretically conservative option is available. If there is a compelling motivation for pluralism, I suggest, it's likely to lie elsewhere.

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Truth is One (No Need for Pluralism)

Volpe

2023

Erkenn

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In this paper, I discuss the currently most popular argument for alethic pluralism, maintaining that the so-called scope problem provides no compelling reason for abandoning the traditional view that truth is one and the same (substantive) property across the various regions of thought or discourse in which it is ascribed or denied to the things we think or say. I disarm the argument by showing that the scope problem does not arise for a number of non-deflationary, monistic views of truth that meet certain semantic and metaphysical constraints, for one can accept any of these views and provide a plausible account of the fact that mental and linguistic tokenings belonging to different regions of discourse involve radically different ways of engaging with reality ? from detecting pre-existing facts to constituting them.

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Truth: One or Many or Both?

Cited by 17 publications

References 14 publications

Alethic pluralism and truthmaker theory

Alethic pluralism and truthmaker theory

Shopping for truth pluralism

Truth is One (No Need for Pluralism)

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