Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions

Deshmukh, Kaustubh; Goldberg, Andrew V.; Hartline, Jason D.; Karlin, Anna R.

doi:10.1007/3-540-45749-6_34

Cited by 55 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Related to our work is the work of Deng et al [6], which studied maximising the auctioneer's revenue in Bayesian double auctions. e same objective was Session 9a: Auctions --Equilibrium EC'17, June 26-30, 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA studied by Deshmukh et al [7] yet in the prior-free model. In [22], mechanisms for some special cases of two-sided markets are presented that work by a combination of random sampling and random serial dictatorship.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 92%

Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions

Colini-Baldeschi

Goldberg

Keijzer

et al. 2017

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

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We develop and extend a line of recent work on the design of mechanisms for two-sided markets. e markets we consider consist of buyers and sellers of a number of items, and the aim of a mechanism is to improve the social welfare by arranging purchases and sales of the items. A mechanism is given prior distributions on the agents' valuations of the items, but not the actual valuations; thus the aim is to maximise the expected social welfare over these distributions. As in previous work, we are interested in the worst-case ratio between the social welfare achieved by a truthful mechanism, and the best social welfare possible.Our main result is an incentive compatible and budget balanced constant-factor approximation mechanism in a se ing where buyers have XOS valuations and sellers' valuations are additive.is is the rst such approximation mechanism for a two-sided market se ing where the agents have combinatorial valuation functions. To achieve this result, we introduce a more general kind of demand query that seems to be needed in this situation. In the simpler case that sellers have unit supply (each having just one item to sell), we give a new mechanism whose welfare guarantee improves on a recent one in the literature. We also introduce a more demanding version of the strong budget balance (SBB) criterion, aimed at ruling out certain "unnatural" transactions satis ed by SBB. We show that the stronger version is satis ed by our mechanisms.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 92%

Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions

Colini-Baldeschi

Goldberg

Keijzer

et al. 2017

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

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“…Many truthful mechanisms have been developed in conventional double auctions, including single-unit [2], [7], [15] and multi-unit double auctions [2], [10]. The majority of these designs follow the idea of McAfees mechanism [15], using the trade reduction to maintain truthfulness.…”

Section: Literature Reviewsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…So it is reasonable to design double auctions for spectrum allocation. Unfortunately, previous truthful double auction designs [2], [15], [7], [26] only consider the single-round case, which is not fit for the continuous spectrum auction where secondary users come in a stochastic way and in an on-line fashion. There are also some papers focused on online double auctions [5], but they only focus on single item.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

TODA: Truthful Online Double Auction for Spectrum Allocation in Wireless Networks

Wang

et al. 2010

2010 IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum (DySPAN)

135

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Abstract-The spectrum usage by a secondary user often happens in a certain geographical region and in a certain time interval, and the requests often come in an online fashion. Considering the selfish behaviors of primary users and secondary users, it is imperative to design online double spectrum auction methods. The most significant challenge is how to make the online double auction economic-robust (truthful in particular). Unfortunately, existing designs either do not consider the online requests or become untruthful when applied to scenarios when both primary users and secondary users could be selfish.In this paper, we address this problem by proposing TODA, a general framework for truthful online double auction for spectrum allocation. We assume that there is a central auctioneer, and the arrivals of secondary users' requests follow Poisson distribution. Upon receiving online spectrum requests, the central auctioneer will decide immediately which secondary and primary users will win the auction, and match winning primary users and secondary users, as well as decide how much secondary users should pay and primary users should get. To preempt existing spectrum usage is not allowed. We study the case in which the conflict graph of secondary users is a complete graph, which occurs in the urban area where the distribution of the secondary users is very dense. In this case, we design strategyproof (truthful) mechanisms for both the primary users and secondary users. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to design truthful online double auction mechanisms for spectrum allocation. Our simulation results show that the expected social efficiency ratio of our mechanism is always above 80% compared with the off-line VCG mechanism and the spectrum utilization ratio is around 70% when the system is highly loaded.

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“…It is similar in spirit to what we present, but cannot be generalized to multiple items. In [176], a modified Vickrey double auction with participation fees is presented, while [34] considers truthful double auction mechanisms and obtains upper bounds on the profit of any such auction. But the setting in both [34,144] is non-combinatorial since each bid is for an individual item only.…”

Section: Previous Work and Our Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Combinatorial Market Processing for Multilateral Coordination

Jain¹,

Varalye²

2005

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Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions

Cited by 55 publications

References 9 publications

Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions

Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions

TODA: Truthful Online Double Auction for Spectrum Allocation in Wireless Networks

Combinatorial Market Processing for Multilateral Coordination

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