Truthful Spectrum Auctions With Approximate Social-Welfare or Revenue

Al‐Ayyoub, Mahmoud; Gupta, Himanshu

doi:10.1109/tnet.2013.2288317

Cited by 14 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…A backward induction method has been proposed to solve the winner and price determination problems. Myerson's virtual valuation concept was adopted in [28] to design a truthful dynamic spectrum access allocation between competing base stations with approximate expected revenue or social welfare. The authors in [17] propose an online auction to allocate spectrum between primary and secondary users.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A two-level auction for resource allocation in multi-tenant C-RAN

et al. 2018

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We consider in this paper a dynamic resource allocation scheme between several Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs), sharing common radio resources at a Cloud-based Radio Access Network (C-RAN) run by a central operator. We specifically propose a two-level coupled auction so as to enhance resource utilization and maximize the revenues both for the central operator and the MVNOs: at the lower level, end users belonging to a given MVNO bid for resources and, at the higher-level, MVNOs compete for resources at the central operator based on the output of the lower-level auction. We show fundamental economic properties of our proposal: truthfulness and individual rationality, and propose a greedy algorithm to enhance its computational efficiency. We prove the existence of Nash equilibrium for the global auction and its uniqueness in a typical duopoly scenario. Further numerical results illustrate the performance of our proposal in various network settings.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Myerson's scheme was used to design a strategy-proof revenue maximization mechanism. We observe that the Nash equilibrium concept was not tackled by [17,26,27,28].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A two-level auction for resource allocation in multi-tenant C-RAN

et al. 2018

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“…Determining a proper auction mechanism is of importance in this method. In [24], a generalized Branco's auction mechanism is introduced which aims at maximizing the profit to the seller, while in [25], a truthful auction mechanism is proposed which aims at maximizing the social welfare or the revenue of the seller. In [26], a knapsack-based auction mechanism is proposed for dynamically allocating the spectrum in the coordinated access band.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentivizing spectrum sharing via subsidy regulations for future wireless networks

et al. 2018

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“…The work is presented as an auction mechanism, and the authors compute the optimal allocation strategy, although nor individual rationality nor truthfulness are analyzed or discussed. Finding a truthful mechanism with approximate social-welfare or revenue is instead the focus of [41], where the authors consider the dynamic spectrum access for both spatial and temporal dimensions. In a similar context, Wu et al design in [42] an auction mechanism that ensures Pareto-optimal relay power allocation, competitive fairness among users, and convergence on the distributed implementation.…”

Section: B Incentive Mechanisms In Communication Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bandwidth and Cache Leasing in Wireless Information Centric Networks: a Game Theoretic Study

Mangili

Martignon

Paris

et al. 2016

IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol.

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Information Centric Networking (ICN) is a novel paradigm that aims at improving the performance of today's Internet by supporting caching and multicast content delivery on every network device. The main contribution of this work is to propose a centralized strategy to stimulate third parties to jointly lease the unused bandwidth and storage available on wireless access points in an ICN. We formulate this problem as a combinatorial reverse auction run by a content provider willing to increase the number of users reached by his service. We show that the optimal allocation with partial coverage problem is NP-hard, we then provide greedy heuristics that guarantee the individual rationality and truthfulness properties, and compare their performance numerically. We evaluate the benefits of our proposed mechanisms in terms of the cost savings for the content provider obtained by offloading his infrastructure through the caches, and the reduced computational time to execute the allocation algorithms. We compare the results obtained in this centralized setting, with those that can be observed when the mobile clients autonomously choose which access point they prefer to use, among those activated by the auction mechanism. We model this second scenario as a congestion game, showing that it exhibits desired properties (i.e., existence and uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium), and comparing its social welfare with the centralized case.

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Truthful Spectrum Auctions With Approximate Social-Welfare or Revenue

Cited by 14 publications

References 37 publications

A two-level auction for resource allocation in multi-tenant C-RAN

A two-level auction for resource allocation in multi-tenant C-RAN

Incentivizing spectrum sharing via subsidy regulations for future wireless networks

Bandwidth and Cache Leasing in Wireless Information Centric Networks: a Game Theoretic Study

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