Truthmakers, knowledge and paradox

de, Dan López; Zardini, Elia

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00681.x

Cited by 46 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…I'm sympathetic to the broad outlines of their treatments of this issue, but don't endorse many of the details. A vindication of the claim that classical theories are unacceptable requires a case-by-case consideration of the best classical theories, a task that is better left for other occasions (see López de Sa and Zardini [2007]; [2010]; Zardini [2008]; [2010a] for a start). I will say much more in section 3 about some of the substantial advantages of the naive theory of truth presented in this paper over its (non-classical) naive rivals, but there again the main purpose of the paper will be not so much to criticise these other theories as to develop a new theory with interesting distinctive features.…”

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confidence: 99%

Truth Without Contra(di)ction

Zardini

2011

The Review of Symbolic Logic

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138

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The concept oftrutharguably plays a central role in many areas of philosophical theorizing. Yet, what seems to be one of the most fundamental principles governing that concept, i.e. the equivalence between ‘ ‘P’ is true’ and ‘P’, is inconsistent in full classical logic, as shown by thesemantic paradoxes. I propose a new solution to those paradoxes, based on a principled revision of classical logic. Technically, the key idea consists in the rejection of the unrestricted validity of the structural principle ofcontraction. I first motivate philosophically this idea with the metaphysical picture of the states-of-affairs expressed by paradoxical sentences as being distinctively “unstable”. I then proceed to demonstrate that the theory of truth resulting from this metaphysical picture is, in many philosophically interesting respects, surprisingly stronger than most other theories of truth endorsing the equivalence between ‘ ‘P’ is true’ and ‘P’ (for example, the theory vindicates the validity of the traditional laws ofexcluded middleand ofnon-contradiction, and also vindicates the traditional constraint oftruth preservationon logical consequence). I conclude by proving acuteliminationtheorem that shows the consistency of the theory.

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confidence: 99%

Truth Without Contra(di)ction

Zardini

2011

The Review of Symbolic Logic

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138

111

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“…Nevertheless, the characterization provided by López de Sa and Zardini (2007) seems to follow the right track. We may try to refine it by making more precise about what is meant when it is said that in paradoxes the premises do not rationally support the conclusion.…”

Section: The Notion Of Paradoxmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…(Of course, the notion of paradox is a vague one.) Thanks to Jose Díez, Manuel García-Carpintero and an anonymous referee for important insights on this issue.5 To the best of my knowledge, the idea of using Curry's paradox as a counterexample to Definition 1 was first proposed by López de Sa andZardini (2007). 6 I will use the brackets (' ' and ' ') in order to indicate some device of canonical name formation for sentences; thus, ' φ ' is just a name for the sentence φ and 'T φ ' ascribes truth to the sentence φ.…”

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confidence: 99%

Some Remarks on the Notion of Paradox

Oms

2022

Acta Anal

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This paper argues that the traditional characterization of the notion of paradox — an apparently valid argument with apparently true premises and an apparently false conclusion — is too narrow; there are paradoxes that do not satisfy it. After discussing, and discarding, some alternatives, an outline of a new characterization of the notion of paradox is presented. A paradox is found to be an apparently valid argument such that, apparently, it does not present the kind of commitment to the conclusion that should be implied by an acceptance of the truth of the premises and the validity of the argument.

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“…Some elaboration on what happened in the last paragraph is now in order. To wit, the point does not eventually hinge on the idea that a paradox must have an apparently false conclusion, for it needn't (López de Sa and Zardini [25], p. 246; Oms and Zardini [27], p. 8, fn 14; Zardini [55], pp. 494-506).…”

Section: K3lp Tmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Final Cut

Zardini

2022

J Philos Logic

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In a series of works, Pablo Cobreros, Paul Égré, David Ripley and Robert van Rooij have proposed a nontransitive system (call it ‘K3LP’) as a basis for a solution to the semantic paradoxes. I critically consider that proposal at three levels. At the level of the background logic, I present a conception of classical logic on which K3LP fails to vindicate classical logic not only in terms of structural principles, but also in terms of operational ones. At the level of the theory of truth, I raise a cluster of philosophical difficulties for a K3LP-based system of naive truth, all variously related to the fact that such a system proves things that would seem already by themselves repugnant, even in the absence of transitivity. At the level of the theory of validity, I consider an extension of the K3LP-based system of naive validity that is supposed to certify that validity in that system does not fall short of naive validity, argue that such an extension is untenable in that its nontriviality depends on the inadmissibility of a certain irresistible instance of transitivity (whence the advertised “final cut”) and conclude on this basis that the K3LP-based system of naive validity cannot coherently be adopted either. At all these levels, a crucial role is played by certain metaentailments and by the extra strength they afford over the corresponding entailments: on the one hand, such strength derives from considerations that would seem just as compelling in a general nontransitive framework, but, on the other hand, such strength wreaks havoc in the particular setting of K3LP.

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Truthmakers, knowledge and paradox

Cited by 46 publications

References 12 publications

Truth Without Contra(di)ction

Truth Without Contra(di)ction

Some Remarks on the Notion of Paradox

The Final Cut

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