Trying without fail

Holguín, Ben; Lederman, Harvey

doi:10.1007/s11098-024-02204-9

Philos Stud

2024

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02204-9

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Trying without fail

Ben Holguín,

Harvey Lederman

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2024

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Cited by 3 publications

References 73 publications

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Defining common ground

Yalcin

2024

Linguist and Philos

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Stalnaker (Context, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) defends two ideas about common ground. The first is that the common ground of a conversation is definable in terms of an iterated propositional attitude of acceptance, so that p is common ground iff p is commonly accepted. The second is the idea that the “default setting" of conversational acceptance is belief, so that as a default, what is accepted in conversation coincides with what is (commonly) believed. In this paper, I argue that we should favor a pair of contrasting theses instead. First, I argue that we should identify the common ground with what is common knowledge about what is accepted, so that p is common ground iff it is common knowledge that p is accepted. Thus the attitude that is iterated in the definition of common ground is not acceptance but knowledge. Second, I argue that the “default setting" for conversational acceptance is not belief, but knowledge.

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Defining common ground

Yalcin

2024

Linguist and Philos

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The Logic of Action and Control

Mollica

2023

J Philos Logic

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On the dilemma for partial subjunctive supposition

Zhang

2024

Analysis

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In ‘The logic of partial supposition’, Eva and Hartmann present a dilemma for a normative account of partial subjunctive supposition: the natural subjunctive analogue of Jeffrey conditionalization is Jeffrey imaging, but this rule violates a natural monotonicity constraint. This paper offers a partial defence of Jeffrey imaging against Eva and Hartmann’s objection. I show that, although Jeffrey imaging is non-monotonic in Eva and Hartmann’s sense, it is what I call status quo monotonic. A status quo monotonic credal revision rule is monotonic in Eva and Hartmann’s sense if it is conservative in the sense of Meehan and Zhang (‘Jeffrey meets Kolmogorov’), but Jeffrey imaging is in general non-conservative. On the other hand, Jeffrey imaging satisfies a different constraint that I call convexity, and the only rule that is both convex and conservative is Jeffrey conditionalization. To this extent, the real dilemma for a normative account of partial subjunctive supposition is not between monotonicity (broadly construed) and Jeffrey imaging, but between convexity and conservativeness.

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Trying without fail

Cited by 3 publications

References 73 publications

Defining common ground

Defining common ground

The Logic of Action and Control

On the dilemma for partial subjunctive supposition

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