Tsunami Assessment for Risk Management at Nuclear Power Facilities in Japan

Yanagisawa, Ken; Imamura, Fumihiko; Sakakiyama, Tsutomu; Annaka, Tadashi; Takeda, Takahiro; Shuto, Nobuo

doi:10.1007/978-3-7643-8364-0_16

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…In this section, we first briefly review the design tsunami heights and the actual tsunami heights at these NPSs. The design tsunami heights for the Japanese NPSs were set by a deterministic method, based on the past large earthquakes and by making parameter studies (Yanagisawa et al, 2007). For the Fukushima-1 and -2 NPSs, the 1938 Shioya-oki earthquakes, a series of large earthquakes with M = 7.4 to 7.8 (Abe, 1977), were used for the parameter studies.…”

Section: Tsunami Accidents and Hazard Assessment At Nuclear Power Stmentioning

confidence: 99%

Time and Space Distribution of Coseismic Slip of the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake as Inferred from Tsunami Waveform Data

Satake

Fujii

Harada

et al. 2013

Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America

473

471

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A multiple time-window inversion of 53 high-sampling tsunami waveforms on ocean bottom pressure, GPS, coastal wave, and tide gauges shows a temporal and spatial slip distribution during the 2011 Tohoku earthquake. The fault rupture started near the hypocenter and propagated into both deep and shallow parts of the plate interface. Very large, approximately 25 m, slip off Miyagi on the deep part, at a location similar to the previous 869 Jogan earthquake model, was responsible for the initial rise of tsunami waveforms and the recorded tsunami inundation in Sendai and Ishinomaki plains. Huge slip, up to 69 m, occurred on the shallow part near the trench axis 3 min after the rupture initiation. This delayed shallow rupture extended for 400 km with more than 10 m slip, at a location similar to the 1896 Sanriku tsunami earthquake, and was responsible for the peak amplitudes of the tsunami waveforms and the maximum tsunami heights measured on the northern Sanriku coast, 100 km north of the largest slip. The average slip on the entire fault is 9.5 m and the total seismic moment is 4.2 × 10 22 Nm (Mw = 9.0). The large horizontal displacement of seafloor slope is responsible for 20 to 40 % of tsunami amplitudes. The 2011 deep slip alone can reproduce the distribution of the 869 tsunami deposits, indicating that the 869 Jogan earthquake source could be similar to the 2011 earthquake at least in the deep plate interface. The large tsunami at the Fukushima nuclear power station is due to the combination of the deep and shallow slip, or triggering of shallow slip by the deep slip, which was not accounted in the previous tsunami hazard assessments.

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Section: Tsunami Accidents and Hazard Assessment At Nuclear Power Stmentioning

confidence: 99%

Time and Space Distribution of Coseismic Slip of the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake as Inferred from Tsunami Waveform Data

Satake

Fujii

Harada

et al. 2013

Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America

473

471

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Various Asian countries with a geographical location and customs and traditions similar to those of Taiwan have been successful in applying risk management for public works. Yanagisawa et al (2007) simulated changes in seawater levels that are caused by tsunamis in the coastal areas of Japan to evaluate the risk factors of the operation and management of coastal nuclear power facilities (Yanagisawa et al, 2007). Seo and Choi (2008) listed the risks of a Korean subway construction project and conducted an impact assessment and case analysis to generate a safe construction plan at the design stage (Seo & Choi, 2008).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Identifying critical risk factors and responses of river dredging projects for knowledge management within organisation

Chou

Chiu

2021

J Flood Risk Management

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A river exhibits strong upstream erosion and rapid downstream accumulation. Dredging is one of the methods that is most commonly adopted by the Taiwan Water Resources Agency (WRA) to ensure the smooth flow of rivers and their ability to discharge water, protecting lives and property from flood disasters. However, dredging projects are large, involving very many stakeholders, leading to high uncertainty in the implementation of the project. The WRA also lacks relevant risk management methods and countermeasures owing to the periodical brain drain and retirement within the organisation. In order to enhance risk management for dredging engineers, river management offices across the country were visited, and knowledge and experience of dredging engineering were obtained using expert meetings and scientific methods. Work was carried out with the WRA to identify six major risk categories for dredging projects, covering 30 risks. An Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) questionnaire was developed using the Risk Breakdown Structure (RBS), and a Risk Impact/Frequency Analysis (RIFA) questionnaire was developed using the Important/Performance Analysis (IPA) method; these were answered by 69 engineers with experience in river dredging. Finally, critical risk factors are identified and ranked by combining the responses to the questionnaires and in the interviews, helping engineers with risk management in the future. Research results demonstrate that most of the engineering management experience in practice is communicated by word of mouth, with no effective and systematic method of knowledge management. Therefore, a knowledge‐based system is created, covering 170 risk events and solutions for various dredging projects, and a graphical user information system is built in a programming language, to enable the WRA to save engineering experience systematically for future exploitation.

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“…The new precautions against tsunamis were general in nature and did not result in a significant upgrade of tsunami countermeasures at Fukushima or other plants. Tepco and its university collaborators (Yanagisawa et al, 2007) took the approach of first assuming a particular source model for an earthquake and then trying to calculate the maximum tsunami height using numerical simulations, but they downplayed historical and paleo-tsunami data in these efforts.…”

Section: The 2004 Sumatra Earthquakementioning

confidence: 99%

Fukushima: The myth of safety, the reality of geoscience

Nöggerath¹,

Geller²,

Gusiakov³

2011

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

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In a report to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Japanese government stated that the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster was caused not by the Tohoku earthquake but by the tsunami it generated, resulting in a loss of power for the station's cooling systems and, consequently, three core meltdowns. The tsunami countermeasures taken when Fukushima Daiichi was designed in the 1960s were, arguably, marginally acceptable considering the scientific data then available. But, between the 1970s and the 2011 disaster, new scientific knowledge emerged about the likelihood of a large earthquake and resulting tsunami; however, this was ignored by both the plant operator, Tokyo Electric Power Company, and government regulators. The regulatory authorities failed to properly review the tsunami countermeasures in accordance with IAEA guidelines and continued to allow the Fukushima plant to operate without sufficient countermeasures, despite having received clear warnings from at least one member of a government advisory committee. The lack of independence of government regulators appears to have contributed to this inaction. The anzen shinwa (Òsafety mythÓ) image portrayed by the Japanese government and electric power companies tended to stifle honest and open discussion of the risks. Japan's seismological agencies are locked into outdated and unsuccessful paradigms that lead them to focus on the hazard of a supposedly imminent earthquake in the Tokai district, located between Tokyo and Nagoya, while downplaying earthquake hazards elsewhere in Japan. Consequently, regulators and the plant operator missed many opportunities to avert the calamity at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.

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Tsunami Assessment for Risk Management at Nuclear Power Facilities in Japan

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

Time and Space Distribution of Coseismic Slip of the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake as Inferred from Tsunami Waveform Data

Time and Space Distribution of Coseismic Slip of the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake as Inferred from Tsunami Waveform Data

Identifying critical risk factors and responses of river dredging projects for knowledge management within organisation

Fukushima: The myth of safety, the reality of geoscience

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