Detailed data on individual applicants to a large public university are used to demonstrate that net price responsiveness decreases with need and ability. Enrollment effects are simulated and show a movement towards a high tuition/high aid (low tuition/low aid) policy significantly lowers (raises) tuition revenue with a modest increase (decrease) in the number of aid-eligible students.
Aim High or Go Low? Pricing Strategies and Enrollment Effects when the Net Price Elasticity Varies with Need and AbilityThere is a broad national consensus among academics, policy makers, and college administrators that expanding college access to higher education for low-income students is crucial to developing an effective U.S. poverty policy (St. John, 2003). Education policy pundits disagree, however, on whether the most auspicious tuition policy to expand access should follow a high tuition/high aid (HH) model that targets aid or a low tuition/low aid (LL) model that provides universal aid (Mumper, 2003). Specifically, HH proponents contend that on efficiency and equity grounds list tuition should reflect the true cost of college, but that the actual price net of aid should reflect one's ability to pay (Mortenson, 1993;Schorr, 1988). Conversely, LL advocates argue that college subsidies should be spread more evenly over the student population, because targeted aid programs are unable to attract the necessary long-term popular support and funding (Wilson, 1987;Johnstone, 1997).Implicit in both the HH and LL models are some form of subsidy motivated by the notion that higher education has a public as well as a private return. Moreover, de facto public policy has led to the real cost of college net of aid increasing for all students (i.e., a higher real tuition, lower real aid) with the rationale that the return to college has increased in recent decades and is primarily private in nature (Card, 1999). Thus, the largely theoretical debate regarding the efficacy of the HH versus LL pricing strategies on access takes place in the context of an increasing public expectation that students are, and should be, responsible for covering the lion's share of the cost of college (Heller, 2001).
4This paper enters the HH-LL debate in the context of a single large public university, the University of Oregon (UO), by examining the access, quality, and revenue consequences of moving away or towards their explicit LL-mission for (needy) in-state students and implicit HH-policy for (able) out of state students. The UO is an ideal setting to study differences in price responsiveness by need and ability because prior work suggests that net price variation (i.e., tuition minus aid) is largely determined at the institution level and because flagship public institutions tend to attract a deep and heterogeneous pool of freshman applicants (Curs & Singell, 2002). On the other hand, McMillen, Singell, and Waddell (2007) find that there is a hierarchy of institutions that compete across different applicant pools comprised of students who likely d...