2009
DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2008.10.001
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Tunneling and propping up: An analysis of related party transactions by Chinese listed companies

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Cited by 284 publications
(286 citation statements)
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“…The results indicate that related-party transactions enjoy a more positive CSR effect on long-term M&A performance than those with non-related party transactions. Our findings are contradicted by some studies, which concluded CSR leads to a "Resource Hollowing" effect [9,[51][52][53][54]. However, our findings are consistent with studies which concluded CSR brings about an "Efficiency Enhancing" effect [11][12][13].…”
Section: Effects Of Related-party Transactions On Csr-performance Linsupporting
confidence: 50%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The results indicate that related-party transactions enjoy a more positive CSR effect on long-term M&A performance than those with non-related party transactions. Our findings are contradicted by some studies, which concluded CSR leads to a "Resource Hollowing" effect [9,[51][52][53][54]. However, our findings are consistent with studies which concluded CSR brings about an "Efficiency Enhancing" effect [11][12][13].…”
Section: Effects Of Related-party Transactions On Csr-performance Linsupporting
confidence: 50%
“…Significant evidence exists to show that controlling shareholders are more likely to tunnel through related-party transactions than to prop up a firm [51][52][53]. With respect to M&A activities, there are also negative effects of related-party transactions.…”
Section: Csr Related-party Transactions and Long-term Manda Performancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…(iii) Cash payments, including loans, cash payments or provision of cash guarantees by the listed firm to its controlling shareholders in the pyramids (Cheung et al 2008). …”
Section: Event Study Analysis: Rpts and Insider Controlmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…By deriving data from filings of connected transactions, [18] and [19] are able to classify connected transactions into three categories: a) transactions that are a priori to result in expropriation (asset acquisitions, asset sales, equity sales, and trading relationships and cash payments), b) transactions that are likely benefit the listed firms (cash receipts and subsidiary relationships), and c) transactions that may have been driven by strategic rationales (takeover offers and joint ventures, joint venture stake acquisitions and sales). Reference [19] further categorizes these transactions into tunneling or propping activities. They find that there are more tunneling than propping in their sample of filings by Chinese listed companies.…”
Section: The Importance Of Rpts Disclosuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Different types of RPTs require different level of disclosures, especially when the disclosure is associated with different underlying incentives and has differential effect on the firm. As discussed above, [19] which categorize RPTs into tunneling or propping activities indicate that disclosure of information differs between those two types of transactions. They suggest that manipulation of information disclosure may be used by controlling shareholders to conceal expropriation.…”
Section: Issues On Rpts Disclosurementioning
confidence: 99%