2000
DOI: 10.1080/13501760010014948
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'Turbo-charged negotiations': the EU and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

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Cited by 54 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…Germany demonstrated that it was a committed member of the alliance and that it was prepared to play a more active role in bringing peace and stability to the Balkans, both militarily and through what has been dubbed the 'turbo-powered diplomacy' surrounding the end of the hostilities and the launching of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. 55 Germany's role as president of the G8 and the EU/WEU placed the Red-Green government at the centre of international diplomacy. In his memoirs, Schröder points to a number of factors defining the legacy of Germany's participation in OAF.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Germany demonstrated that it was a committed member of the alliance and that it was prepared to play a more active role in bringing peace and stability to the Balkans, both militarily and through what has been dubbed the 'turbo-powered diplomacy' surrounding the end of the hostilities and the launching of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. 55 Germany's role as president of the G8 and the EU/WEU placed the Red-Green government at the centre of international diplomacy. In his memoirs, Schröder points to a number of factors defining the legacy of Germany's participation in OAF.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These had led to a major re-assessment of enlargement as a strategic tool to promote security in the wider Europe. This was most evident in the inclusion of a membership perspective in the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) hastily developed for the countries of the Western Balkans in spring 1999 (Friis and Murphy 2000). It also affected existing CEE applicants though.…”
Section: Helsinki and The Opening Of Accession Negotiationsmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…6. Although the EU in this respect was accused of a divide-and-rule strategy, the applicants were just as insistent on the principle of differentiation (claiming its reinforcement on the Helsinki IGC in 1999), since they did not wish the progress of their accession to be linked to that of others (Friis and Murphy, 2000). 7.…”
Section: Notesmentioning
confidence: 97%