Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order: strategic autonomy or new forms of dependence?

Abstract

Turkish foreign policy has dramatically transformed over the last two decades. In the first decade of the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) rule, the ‘logic of interdependence’ constituted the driving motive of Turkish foreign policy. In the second decade, however, the ‘logic of interdependence’ and the soft power-driven ‘mediator–integrator’ role were gradually replaced with a quest for ‘strategic autonomy’, accompanied by interventionism, unilateralism and coercive diplomacy. This article explores the causes of this dramatic shift. We argue that ‘strategic autonomy’, which goes beyond a moderate level of status-seeking compatible with Turkey's material power credentials, has a double connotation in the Turkish context. First, it constitutes a framework for the Turkish ruling elite to align with the non-western great powers and balance the US-led hierarchical order. Second, and more importantly, it serves as a legitimating foreign policy discourse for the government to mobilize its electoral base at home, fragment opposition and accrue popular support. We conclude that the search for autonomy from its western allies and the move towards the Russia–China axis has led to Turkey's isolation and permitted the emergence of new forms of dependence.

Chinese Investment in Turkey: The Belt and Road Initiative, Rising Expectations and Ground Realities

“…This period was marked by Turkey asserting itself more aggressively through its military involvement and coercive diplomacy in regional conflicts, as well as the acceleration of anti-EU and anti-US discourse of the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) government led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Kutluay and Öniş 2021, 1091; Chen 2020). To this end, partnerships with countries that seemingly challenge Western liberal democratic values, such as China and Russia, were prioritized (Kutlay andÖniş 2021, 1093;Tao 2016, 24). Kutlay and Öniş (2021) argue that Turkey's contemporary diplomacy based on 'assertive autonomy' is motivated by the Erdoğan administration's desire to consolidate its domestic support base.…”

External Contestations of Europe: Russia and Turkey as Normative Challengers?*

“…Regarding the data, in the case of Russia, we focus exclusively on the narrative developed by President Putin owing to the centralized decision making in the country and the Kremlin's ultimate authority in defining national foreign policy. As for Turkey, although the country has a vibrant opposition which also articulates its varied views on Turkish foreign policy including relations with the EU, we focus in particular on President Erdoğan's discourse as ‘executive aggrandizement and associated de‐institutionalisation’ since 2014 has made him the central figure in the country's foreign policy making (Kutlay and Öniş, 2021, p. 1088). Although we are aware that both actors contest Europe also in their appeals to their domestic audiences, we are particularly interested in the ways in which they undertake contestation at the regional/global level.…”

“…During the time that Turkey embarked on the process of Europeanization in the 2000s, despite some domestic contestation, the normative power of the EU in transforming Turkish governance was largely acknowledged by the government and the main opposition (Aydın‐Düzgit, 2018) and rather than contesting the EU in its foreign policy, Turkey tried to use its albeit weak prospect of accession as an asset in furthering its presence in its surrounding regions (Kaliber and Kaliber, 2019, p. 7). However, as the membership perspective turned increasingly sour in the 2010s and the EU's normative projection on Turkey began to be heavily contested inside with the country's turn towards competitive authoritarianism (Esen and Gumuscu, 2016) and anti‐Westernism (Kaliber and Kaliber, 2019), Turkey's distance with the EU in foreign policy orientations also grew (Kutlay and Öniş, 2021). Yet, with some exceptions (Langan, 2017), there has not been any systematic research into whether, and if so how, Turkey contests the EU's actorness in their shared neighbourhood and/or at the global forums.…”

Turkey's Growing Role as a Security Actor in Somalia: Dynamics and Motivations

“…The third factor is the geopolitical developments in the region and in the world that have a significant impact on the evolution of Turkey's foreign and security policy. For example, the Syrian war has presented political, social, and security challenges to Turkey (Kutlay -Öniş, 2021(Kutlay -Öniş, , 1087. For instance, millions of Syrian refugees migrated to Turkey during the civil war.…”