This paper seeks to determine the value of theoretical ideal-types of medical control. Whilst ideal types (such as the iron cage and gaze) need revision in their application to medical settings, they remain useful in describing and explaining patterns of control and autonomy in the medical profession. The apparent transition from the cage to the gaze has often been over-stated since both types are found in many contemporary health reforms. Indeed, forms of neo-bureaucracy have emerged alongside surveillance of the gaze. These types are contextualised and elaborated in terms of two empirical examples: the management of medical performance and financial incentives for senior hospital doctors in England. Findings point towards the reformulation of medical control, an on-going re-stratification of the medical profession, and the internalisation of managerial discourses. The cumulative effect involves the medical profession's ability to re-cast and enhance its position (vis-à-vis managerial interests).Keywords: medical profession, medical control, iron cage, gaze This paper explores the modes of control of doctors by health-care institutions. Primarily, it assesses the value of applying two theoretical ideal-types to understand and explain physician (medical) control. It is argued that such modes of control have a significant bearing upon doctors' motivation, job satisfaction and ultimately the quality of care which they deliver.The paper is organised in three sections. First, it summarises the main arguments of the two ideal-types: the "cage" and the "gaze." These ideal-types need elaboration to enable their application to the context of the medical profession. Second, the paper outlines two empirical examples of medical performance and financial incentives relating to medical pay in the English National Health Service (NHS). This section examines these examples as illustrations and applications of the control. Finally, the paper draws conclusions about the value of such conceptual approaches in explaining the management and control of doctors.
Ideal-types of occupational controlDrawing on Reed's (1999) thesis, this section presents two ideal-types which represent contrasting perspectives upon control of occupations by managerial and other external interests. The ideal-types are heuristic devices which generalise experiences from Western countries, specifically the UK. During the second half of