Tweeting theJihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq

Abstract

Social media have played an essential role in the jihadists' operational strategy in Syria and Iraq, and beyond. Twitter in particular has been used to drive communications over other social media platforms. Twitter streams from the insurgency may give the illusion of authenticity, as a spontaneous activity of a generation accustomed to using their cell phones for self-publication, but to what extent is access and content controlled? Over a period of three months, from January through March 2014, information was collected from the Twitter accounts of 59 Western-origin fighters known to be in Syria. Using a snowball method, the 59 starter accounts were used to collect data about the most popular accounts in the network-at-large. Social network analysis on the data collated about Twitter users in the Western Syria-based fighters points to the controlling role played by feeder accounts belonging to terrorist organizations in the insurgency zone, and by Europe-based organizational accounts associated with the banned British organization, Al Muhajiroun, and in particular the London-based preacher, Anjem Choudary. The jihadist insurgents in Syria and Iraq use all manner of social media apps and file-sharing platforms, most prominently Ask.fm, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, PalTalk, kik, viper, JustPaste.it, and Tumblr. Encryption software like TOR is used in communications with journalists to obscure locational information. But circumstances conspire to make Twitter the most popular application. Specifically engineered for cellphones, it is easy and inexpensive to use. Posts (tweets) may contain images or text, links to other platforms can be embedded, and an incoming tweet can effortlessly be forwarded to everyone in an address list. Some types of social media require either 3G or wi-fi access but Twitter can be used in the absence of either.

Voldelig transnational aktivisme: Islamisk Stat, foreign fighters og radikalisering

“…Analysen af de danske data vil fortløbende bliver understøttet af og sat i forhold til udenlandske data og analyser af foreign fighters (Coolsaet 2015;Barret 2014;Weggemans, Bakker & Grol 2014). Endelig inddrager analysen af Islamisk Stats propagandavirksomhed og rekrutteringsarbejde online materiale i form af videoer, taler, tweets m.m., som andre har verificeret som stammende fra Islamisk Stat (se Carter, Maher & Neuman 2014;Farwell 2014;Klausen 2015).…”

“…Hvis man kigger på maengden af selfies, som foreign fighters deler på sociale medier, samt producerede youtube-videoer og tweets fra frontlinjen (Berger & Morgan 2015;Klausen 2015), er det svaert ikke at få den tanke, at mange er lige så meget ude i et selvdannelses-eller selvpromoveringsprojekt som i et politisk-religiøst aerinde. Mange foreign figthers synes meget bevidste om det selvbillede, de kommunikerer til andre, og religiøs og politisk retorik er såle-des snarere en ramme for at kommunikere også personlige budskaber end et dybtsiddende motiv i sig selv (Coolsaet 2015:11).…”

Social Network Analysis of German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq

“…25 Jihadists have indeed turned to a whole range of social media applications to reach recruits from across the globe. 26 Radicals use these technologies to transmit the message of threat to transnational identity, and exhibit vivid imagery of Muslim suffering in conflict zones. At a more basic level, social media provides information on jihadi arenas and helpful advice on how to make a journey to distant conflicts.…”

Framing the UK’s counter-terrorism policy within the context of a wicked problem

“…The use of modern technology is the third core element that can confound the success of the PREVENT strategy, as terrorist groups are able to utilize those technologies as both a means of disseminating their ideological messages but also, in the case of critical infrastructures, as a potential target that will cause disruption to Western economies (Tsfati and Weimann, 2002;Conway, 2006;Denning, 2010;Klausen, 2015). The obvious tensions here relate to the freedom of speech and expression (within the limits of the law), that is the cornerstone of democratic societies, and the need to curtail all forms of inflammatory communication.…”