2019
DOI: 10.1080/00472336.2019.1637922
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Two Decades ofReformasiin Indonesia: Its Illiberal Turn

Abstract: There has been an accentuation of Indonesian democracy's illiberal characteristics during the course of reformasi. The religious and nativist mobilisation that surrounded the controversial 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial elections was only one manifestation of the sort of pressures leading to such accentuation. This article surveys the impacts of a stronger recent turn towards illiberalism across diverse areas of policy making in Indonesia, including decentralisation, civil-military relations, economic and foreign … Show more

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Cited by 59 publications
(49 citation statements)
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“…In 2010, under the coordination of Yogyakarta's Regional Disaster Management Agency (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah, BPBD) at the district level, each village established desa siaga bencana (disaster preparedness and resilient villages programme) to prepare a contingency plan in case of emergency, including a standard operating procedure at hamlet level. We could read this shift towards empowering hamlets as an instance of reformasi, which entailed a devolution of 'governing powers and services from central to local governments' (Diprose et al 2019). Reformasi occurred after Suharto's rule ended in 1998-1999 and, while it is appealing to think of the grassroots monitoring networks as a direct product of a wider governmental push on reformasi, its origins lie in forms of communal solidarity that have shaped life and civic-ritual duty in Yogyakarta for centuries, and are locally widely acknowledged: 'for us, it is almost a sin not to share what we know and [not] to care for each other' (interview Mas Yuyi 2016).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In 2010, under the coordination of Yogyakarta's Regional Disaster Management Agency (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah, BPBD) at the district level, each village established desa siaga bencana (disaster preparedness and resilient villages programme) to prepare a contingency plan in case of emergency, including a standard operating procedure at hamlet level. We could read this shift towards empowering hamlets as an instance of reformasi, which entailed a devolution of 'governing powers and services from central to local governments' (Diprose et al 2019). Reformasi occurred after Suharto's rule ended in 1998-1999 and, while it is appealing to think of the grassroots monitoring networks as a direct product of a wider governmental push on reformasi, its origins lie in forms of communal solidarity that have shaped life and civic-ritual duty in Yogyakarta for centuries, and are locally widely acknowledged: 'for us, it is almost a sin not to share what we know and [not] to care for each other' (interview Mas Yuyi 2016).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Less than two years after Suharto's resignation, democratic cosmopolitanism was already faltering. While the editors of this special issue date the illiberal turn in Indonesian politics to around 2009 (Diprose, McRae, and Hadiz 2019), it was clearly foreshadowed in the immediate aftermath of President Wahid's March 2000 speech in which he apologised to the victims and survivors of the anti-communist massacres of 1965/1966 and went on to signal his support for rescinding the ban on Marxism-Leninism that had been in place since 1966 (Kompas, March 26, 2000). Given that communism in Indonesia had been violently obliterated in the mid-1960s and that the Cold War was over, Wahid's initiative may appear to have been a relatively uncontroversial step towards democratic liberalisationonly a handful of countries worldwide ban communism.…”
Section: The Tide Turnsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet thanks to his weak position both within parliament and his own party, Jokowi devoted much of his time in the early years of his presidency firming his political base by cultivating alliances wherever he could. This included seeking the support of political parties that had backed Prabowo, powerful oligarchs and, as detailed in Diprose, McRae, and Hadiz (2019), unreconstructed New Order-era military figures. To the consternation (and, later, dismay) of many of his liberal leaning supporters, Jokowi's choice of political bedfellows saw his government abandon much of its reformist rhetoric and allow his ministers to indulge in a brand of xenophobic nationalism not far removed from that of his rival.…”
Section: Authoritarian Nativism Resurgentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The criticism of Indonesia’s democracy and democracy promotion is twofold. Firstly, scholars question the intentions and effectiveness of Indonesian initiatives; secondly, Indonesia is criticised for the recent democracy decline (Robison and Hadiz, 2017; also Diprose et al, 2019).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%