Two-dimensional semantics and the articulation problem

Marconi, Diego

doi:10.1007/s11229-005-7044-x

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Ordinary expressions are not ambiguous (Bealer 2002;Marconi 2005): Twodimensionalism explains the difference in truth-value between…”

Section: Objections To Two-dimensionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two‐Dimensional Semantics

Chalmers

2009

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language

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Two-dimensional approaches to semantics, broadly understood, recognize two ‘dimensions’ of the meaning or content of linguistic items. On these approaches, expressions and their utterances are associated with two different sorts of semantic values, which play different explanatory roles. Typically, one semantic value is associated with reference and ordinary truth-conditions, while the other is associated with the way that reference and truth-conditions depend on the external world. The second sort of semantic value is often held to play a distinctive role in analyzing matters of cognitive significance and/or context-dependence. In this broad sense, even Frege's theory of sense and reference might qualify as a sort of two-dimensional approach.

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“…Ordinary expressions are not ambiguous (Bealer 2002;Marconi 2005): Twodimensionalism explains the difference in truth-value between…”

Section: Objections To Two-dimensionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two‐Dimensional Semantics

Chalmers

2009

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language

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“…Roughly, in these theories one factor or dimension of meaning (the primary intension, in Chalmer's terminology) takes care of Fregean intuitions concerning cognitive significance, while the other (the secondary intension, in Chalmers's terminology) deals with Putnamian or Kripkean intuitions regarding wide content and metaphysical necessity. These two levels must be appropriately independent, i.e., not systematically related in the way sense and reference are in the Fregean framework (where sense determines reference; see § 2.9 below), for otherwise these dual theories, as we may call them, would hardly be distinguishable from the latter (Marconi 2005). Since I try to counter the referentialist trend by proposing a purely descriptivist alternative, an examination of these hybrid proposals falls outside the scope of this book.…”

Section: The Topicmentioning

confidence: 99%

Singular Reference: A Descriptivist Perspective

Orilia

2010

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City (January-July 2006) and at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Cambridge (September-December 2008). I wish to thank both institutions for their wonderful hospitality.Last but not least, I want to express my love and gratitude to Stefania, Ruggero and Delia for their constant love and support, for their patience when I delved too deeply into this project, and, when all is said and done, for just being around.

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“…Chalmers makes this distinction between pluralist and ambiguity theories clear when he defends his two-dimensional theory against the objection that ordinary expressions are not ambiguous (cf. Bealer, 2002, andMarconi, 2005). This objection states that two-dimensionalism cannot account for the statement 'it is metaphysically necessary but not epistemically necessary that water is H 2 O' because it accounts for the two claims, 'it is metaphysically necessary that water is H 2 O' and 'it is epistemically necessary that water is H 2 O', by holding that water expresses the primary intension in the first case, and the secondary intension in the second case.…”

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confidence: 99%

Experimental Philosophy and the Philosophy of Language: A Defence of the Ambiguity Thesis

Hamilton¹

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<p>In this thesis I employ the experimental method to inform three important debates within the philosophy of language. These three debates can loosely be characterised as the following: Strawsonianism vs. Russellianism about the meaning of definite descriptions (Chapter 2), Millianism vs. Descriptivism about the meaning of proper names (Chapter 3), and Internalism vs. Externalism about natural kind terms (Chapter 4). To investigate these debates I use surveys to test the intuitions of ordinary language users, that is, non-philosophers, about the meaning of various terms and phrases in natural language. This included New Zealand undergraduate students, students in China, and participants in the US in order to investigate any cross-cultural differences. The results of these three studies indicate substantial variation in the intuitions held among ordinary language users. I use this variation to defend an ambiguity thesis. According to this thesis, some terms and phrases as they occur in natural language (specifically, proper names, natural kind terms, and definite descriptions) have multiple meanings associated them. No one disambiguation is correct outside of a context of utterance. If the ambiguity thesis is accepted, various philosophical puzzles disappear. I will also address a number of objections that face the general program of this thesis.</p>

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Two-dimensional semantics and the articulation problem

Cited by 7 publications

References 8 publications

Two‐Dimensional Semantics

Two‐Dimensional Semantics

Singular Reference: A Descriptivist Perspective

Experimental Philosophy and the Philosophy of Language: A Defence of the Ambiguity Thesis

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