Two Forms of Memory Knowledge and Epistemological Disjunctivism

Milburn, Joe; Moon, Andrew

doi:10.4324/9781315106243-14

Cited by 1 publication

(9 citation statements)

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“…In addition, we replied to two objections. One of which is proposed by Milburn and Moon's (2019), which says that one can have memory knowledge that p without being able to access her experience related to p , especially when she is sleeping. Yet, we pointed out that such an objection is a general challenge for access internalism rather than a specific one for ED-MS (and also ED-M).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As the reader has probably anticipated, experiential memory is sometimes associated with episodic memory and semantic memory is sometimes associated with propositional memory. Milburn and Moon (2019: 282) use “experiential memory” but favour using “stored memory” rather than “propositional memory”. Someone remembering their own name is offered as an example of stored memory and in discussing the example they note that such memory knowledge “does not depend on any kind of memory image or experience”.…”

Section: Epistemological Disjunctivism Of Memory Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

“…While they argue the case for an epistemological disjunctivism of experiential memory, they regard epistemological disjunctivism of store memory knowledge (ED-MS) not to be viable. Below is their articulation of an epistemological disjunctivism of store memory: ED-MS In paradigmatic cases of stored memory knowledge an agent, S , has stored memory knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of rational support, R , for her belief that p which is both factive (i.e., R's obtaining entails p) and reflectively accessible to S (Milburn and Moon 2019: 291).…”

Section: Objections To Ed-mmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In paradigmatic cases of stored memory knowledge an agent, S , has stored memory knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of rational support, R , for her belief that p which is both factive (i.e., R's obtaining entails p) and reflectively accessible to S (Milburn and Moon 2019: 291).…”

Section: Objections To Ed-mmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to ED-MS, S has stored memory knowledge that p only if S 's belief that p is formed through having rational support which is reflectively accessible and factive. Milburn and Moon (2019: 192) argue that an epistemological disjunctivism of memory does not succeed for what they describe as non-deductive inferential stored memory and non-inferential stored memory knowledge. We will deal with the latter charge here — see section 3 for our response to the former.…”

Section: Objections To Ed-mmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge

Kwok

Ryan

2022

Episteme

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This paper explores the prospects for a Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. We begin by providing an overview of Duncan Pritchard's epistemological disjunctivist account of perceptual knowledge, as well as the theoretical advantages of such an account. Drawing on that account, we present and motivate our own Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. After distinguishing different sorts of memory and the different roles that memory can play in knowledge acquisition, we set out our account and argue that the case for epistemological disjunctivism enjoys parity with the case for epistemological disjunctivism of perceptual knowledge. We also consider objections to our account. The first is from Joe Milburn and Andrew Moon, who argue against a general epistemological disjunctivism of memory on the basis of differences in memory types. The second objection arises from a Radford-like case whereby one's true belief is from memory even though one lacks rational support that is reflectively accessible to one.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Epistemological Disjunctivism Of Memory Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%