The purpose of this chapter is to explore the intersection of experimental philosophy and philosophical logic, an intersection I'll call experimental philosophical logic. In particular, I'll be looldng for and sketching some ways in which experimental results, and empirical results more broadly, can inform and have informed debates within philosophical logic. Here's the plan: first, I'll lay out a way of looking at the situation that makes plain at least one way in which we should expect experimental and logical concerns to overlap. Then, I'll turn to the phenomenon of vagueness, where we can see this overlap explored and developed from multiple angles, showing just how intimately related experiment and logic can be. Finally, I'll canvass some other cases where we have similar reasons to expect productive interactions between experimental methods and formal logic, and point to some examples of productive work in those areas. 3 6 .1 Logic, Pure and AppliedLet's open by briefly considering a distinction between pure and applied logic. This distinction is analogous to the one between pure and applied algebra, or between pure and applied topology, or between pure and applied versions of any branch of mathematics. (I don't pretend that any of these distinctions is precise, or that there are no problem cases; the gist is all that matters.) Roughly, pure logic is an exploration of the properties and relations occupied by logical sys-• terns in themselves, without attending to any particular use they may or may not have. Typical questions within pure logic: is proof system X sound and complete for model theory Y?; is suchand-such a logical system decidable? compact? finitely axiomatizable?; is this rule admissible in that system?; and so on. Pure logic is most naturally thought of as a subfield of mathematics, although it is of course also pursued by researchers in philosophy, linguistics, computer science, electrical engineering, and so on, in pursuit of our own varied research interests.