Two roads to Belgrade: the United States, Great Britain, and the first nonaligned conference

Rakove, Robert B.

doi:10.1080/14682745.2013.871528

Cited by 7 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…Rubinstein 1970: 319). Similar recognition also came from London, Paris and Beijing, as well as from international organisations (Rubinstein 1970: 119;Čavoški 2014, Rakove 2014, Lees 1997). In his 1970 book, Rubinstein wrote:…”

Section: Nonalignment As Status Solidarity As Performancementioning

confidence: 83%

“…Certainly, Marxist-inspired ideas about solidarity and equality that Tito, Kardelj, Pijade, Ðilas and other Yugoslav officials articulated in those years were often genuine. Yet, these ideas did not negate prejudicial views based on broader cultural coda, most of them actively reinforced within an international system that readily recognised white countries like Yugoslavia while repeatedly denying non-white equality (Mills 2015: 222; also see Kilibarda 2010) Stevenson, who argued that it is in the U.S. interest to show support for nonaligned internationalism (Rakove 2014). The Soviets reacted similarly, concluding in private that they could best manipulate the NAM by publically supporting most of its pronouncements (Kullaa 2012).…”

Section: Nonalignment As Status Solidarity As Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

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Performing solidarity: whiteness and status-seeking in the non-aligned world

Subotić

Vučetić

2017

J Int Relat Dev

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The 1955 Afro-Asian Summit at Bandung is regarded as a pivot in the formation of Third World-ism and of coloured solidarity against Western colonialism and global white supremacy. But while this anti-imperialist spirit was no doubt present at Bandung, so were many other spirits, including those of Cold War realpolitik. We consider the different meanings of Bandung by examining the critical role Yugoslavia played in the rise of the Non-Aligned Movement in years that followed the summit. Drawing on primary historical documents, we show that Yugoslav leaders consistently failed to appreciate the racism of the international society and their own racialised privilege in it. They did appreciate, however, that performing solidarity with the decolonised and decolonising nations would bring major status rewards to Yugoslavia in the context of the East-West showdown. That self-consciously anti-imperialist and anti-colonial positions can be thickly enveloped in white ignorance suggests the need for more critical International Relations analyses of race, racism and racialised international hierarchies.

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Section: Nonalignment As Status Solidarity As Performancementioning

confidence: 83%

Section: Nonalignment As Status Solidarity As Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

Performing solidarity: whiteness and status-seeking in the non-aligned world

Subotić

Vučetić

2017

J Int Relat Dev

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“…Cabinet member Denis Healey mentioned the possibility of a Yugoslav being elected as General Secretary of the United Nations on television, 6 while the rising star of the party and soon to be leader Harold Wilson asked in a meeting with the Yugoslav ambassador whether Yugoslavia would be interested in some form of membership of the European Common Market. 7 Overall, British officials generally understood better the need to encourage so-called 'moderate' participation in the NAM than their US counterparts (Rakove, 2014). Both Conservative and Labour governments encouraged continuing Yugoslav non-alignment and, in the 1970s, strongly supported good EEC-Yugoslavia relations for this reason, as did the German Foreign Minister, who viewed Yugoslavia as a moderate voice against Cuba in the NAM (Zaccaria, 2016, 67, 119, 144).…”

Section: More Tito Than Self-management? the Evolution Of Labour Partmentioning

confidence: 99%

From the Cold War to the Kosovo War

Unkovski-Korica¹

2019

Revue D’études Comparatives Est-Ouest

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The protracted and violent collapse of Yugoslavia was one of the profound international crises following the end of the Cold War. The inability of the United Nations to stop the bloodshed, the retreat of Russian power alongside the failure of the European powers to reach a common approach, and the ultimate deployment of US-led NATO forces to settle the Bosnian War and later to conduct the Kosovo War exposed the unlikelihood of what George H.W. Bush had hailed as a 'new world order' based on collective security. The wars of succession in the former Yugoslavia in fact provided the springboard for a different vision of global security under American hegemony, which would characterise in particular George W. Bush's project to reshape global affairs in the new millennium (Rees, 2006, esp. pp. 34-35). It is unsurprising in this context that scholarly production relating to the collapse of Yugoslavia and its importance for international relations has been immense (for a recent short overview: Baker 2015). This article will explore an under-researched aspect of the Yugoslav Wars, namely, their impact on the British Labour Party. While studies of New Labour's foreign policies abound (for an overview, see: Daddow and Gaskarth, 2011), few accounts have emerged of the impact of the Yugoslav Wars on the Labour Left. The latter's decline, which became visible in the mid-1980s, did not make it an attractive proposition for study: it seemed hardly relevant (works exploring the radical left in Britain like Smith and Worley, 2014, were a rarity). With the unexpected election of Jeremy Corbyn to the leadership of the Labour Party in September 2015, however, this changed, with multiple works emerging (Seymour, 2017; Perryman, 2017; Hannah, 2018). While worthwhile, such publications are only the beginnings of an attempt to overcome the lack of serious documented investigations into the activities of the Labour Left generally and since the 1980s especially.

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“…Primeiramente, a participação brasileira na I Conferência de Belgrado suscita algumas incertezas quanto à posição de autonomia brasileira. Essa conferência ocorreu em setembro de 1961, na Iugoslávia, cujo intuito era o de iniciar oficialmente o Movimento dos Não Alinhados (RAKOVE, 2014).…”

Section: A Autonomia Heterodoxa: Um Caminho Alternativo à Peiunclassified

O Brasil na Guerra Fria: autonomia heterodoxa e a Política Externa Independente

Tasca¹

2018

Rev. Carta Inter.

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Este artigo oferece um instrumental epistemológico para o debate em torno do conceito de autonomia no contexto da política externa independente (PEI) brasileira, desenvolvida no começo dos anos de 1960. No ínterim da Guerra Fria, o conceito de autonomia possibilita avaliar a participação dos países da América Latina no conflito a partir de uma concepção endógena da historiografia latino-americana, especialmente a argentina (Juan Carlos Puig) e brasileira (Hélio Jaguaribe). O objetivo deste artigo é articular e aplicar o conceito de autonomia a dois casos singulares na PEI: participação parcial na I Conferência de Belgrado (1961) e mediação na crise dos mísseis de Cuba (1962). Conclui-se que o conceito de autonomia heterodoxa de Puig, sob bases das perspectivas de viabilidade nacional e permissividade internacional de Jaguaribe, enquadra-se como lente explicativa para os dois casos.

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Two roads to Belgrade: the United States, Great Britain, and the first nonaligned conference

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

Performing solidarity: whiteness and status-seeking in the non-aligned world

Performing solidarity: whiteness and status-seeking in the non-aligned world

From the Cold War to the Kosovo War

O Brasil na Guerra Fria: autonomia heterodoxa e a Política Externa Independente

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