Two Sides to Attitudinal Commitment: The Effect of Calculative and Loyalty Commitment on Enforcement Mechanisms in Distribution Channels

Abstract

Previous conceptualizations of attitudinal commitment are extended by considering two very different components of a manufacturer’s attachment to an independent channel intermediary. Relying on commitment theory, a model is developed that describes how attitudinal commitment may reside in either the instrumental or the social strain of a manufacturer’s relationship with its distributor. For each strain, the developmental role played by key facets of the channel setting—relative dependence, pledges, and trust—are shown. Furthermore, the nature of the attachment bond is posited to motivate very different governance mechanisms as the distribution agreement is enforced by either social or contractual means. Empirical support for the model demonstrates that an expanded view of attitudinal commitment is important in understanding the complex nature of attachment in channel relationships.

Customer Loyalty towards Internet Banking in Nigeria

“…[39] defined commitment in an online environment as the intention to maintain a valued relationship with the website. Thus as suggested by [40], businesses need to earn their customers' commitment before they can expect to gain their loyalty. Previous studies [41 -43] reveal that customer commitment in an online transaction significantly influences the development of customer loyalty.…”

Marketing research using single-item indicators in structural equation models

“…Other single-item variables represented those manipulated in the case of an experiment or dichotomous variables, such as manufacturer's pledge of exclusivity (Gilliland and Bello, 2002).…”

The bonding effects of relationship value and switching costs in industrial buyer–seller relationships: An investigation into role differences

“…The commitment concept helps understand this duality in bonding rationales. Commitment occupies a central role in the study of successful relationships between firms (Gilliland & Bello, 2002;Gundlach, Achrol, & Mentzer, 1995;Hunt, Arnett, & Madhavaram, 2006;Morgan & Hunt, 1994). While early research models commitment as a one-dimensional construct (e.g.…”

“…A buyer-seller relationship can be defined as a non-accidental sequence of market transactions between independent market actors (Kleinaltenkamp & Ehret, 2006). The literature suggests that companies maintain relationship bonds either because "they have to", due to high switching costs, or because "they want to", because of high relationship value (Bendapudi & Berry, 1997;Gilliland & Bello, 2002;Gounaris, 2005;Liu, 2006;de Ruyter, Moorman, & Lemmink, 2001). So far, there is little empirical evidence about the consequences of these two motives on companies' behavioral intentions in relationships.…”