Two-state solution to the lottery paradox

Logins, Artūrs

doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01378-x

Cited by 4 publications

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References 43 publications

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“… 16 For more on the dual life of ‘confident’ see Logins 2019 . For an exploration of another epistemically significant gradable adjective that seems to exhibit a maximal only interpretation, namely ‘supported’, see Logins 2020 .…”

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Graded epistemic justification

Hawthorne

Logins

2020

Philos Stud

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The adjective 'is justified' has all the hallmarks of a gradable adjective. But the relationship between gradable uses and straightforward predications of the form 'x is justified' has been underexplored by epistemologists. In this paper we undertake to do some ground clearing as a prelude to better understanding this relationship. Keywords Justification Á Gradability Á Degrees of justification Á Degrees Á Credence Á Scale Á Scalar Á Justified Á Gradable adjectives Á Epistemic justification 2 Evidence for gradability Linguists use a variety of superficial tests for whether an adjective is gradable. 'Justified' passes these tests with flying colours.

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confidence: 99%

Graded epistemic justification

Hawthorne

Logins

2020

Philos Stud

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“…Interestingly, following these observations, HRS write, "These examples suggest that, at least for some, 'believe' is a bit like 'open': when something is open to any degree it is open, when you believe something to any degree you believe it". Logins (2020) suggests, based on a very similar analogy, that believes (or rather, is confident that, which Logins takes to capture the ordinary notion of belief) has two senses, a minimal one and a maximal one. That is, just as open is a minimal gradable adjective, there is a reading of confident where having a minimal degree of confidence that p entails being confident that p. But, as Kennedy (2007) notes, open also allows maximal interpretations, such that something must have the maximum degree of openness to qualify as open simpliciter.…”

Section: Weak Upper Boundsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strong Belief is Ordinary

Clarke

2022

Episteme

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In an influential recent paper, Hawthorne, Rothschild, and Spectre (“HRS”) argue that belief is weak. More precisely: they argue that the referent of believe in ordinary language is much weaker than epistemologists usually suppose; that one needs very little evidence to be entitled to believe a proposition in this sense; and that the referent of believe in ordinary language just is the ordinary concept of belief. I argue here to the contrary. HRS identify two alleged tests of weakness – the neg-raising and weak upper bounds tests, as I call them – which they claim believe and think pass. But I identify several other expressions in ordinary English for attributing belief, all of which fail both tests. Therefore, even if HRS are correct that believe and think refer to a weak attitude, it does not follow that the ordinary concept of belief is weak. I conclude by raising some problems for the accounts of belief as guessing, building on HRS's arguments, due to Kevin Dorst, Matt Mandelkern, and Ben Holguín.

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Is an Increase in Probability Always an Increase in Evidential Support?

Logins

2020

Erkenn

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Peter Achinstein has argued at length and on many occasions that the view according to which evidential support is defined in terms of probability-raising faces serious counterexamples and, hence, should be abandoned. Proponents of the positive probabilistic relevance view have remained unconvinced. The debate seems to be in a deadlock. This paper is an attempt to move the debate forward and revisit some of the central claims within this debate. My conclusion here will be that while Achinstein may be right that his counterexamples undermine probabilistic relevance views of what it is for e to be evidence that h, there is still room for a defence of a related probabilistic view about an increase in being supported, according to which, if p(h|e) > p(h), then h is more supported given e than it is without e. My argument relies crucially on an insight from recent work on the linguistics of gradable adjectives.and partially wrong. If we focus on the positive form of 'being evidentially supported' or 'being evidence that h' in its ordinary sense, then Achinstein seems to be right in claiming that e being evidence that h cannot be fully captured by mere appeal to an increase in probability. Probabilist views that claim otherwise are problematic. However, if we focus on comparative forms, e.g. 'h is more supported given e, than without e', then there is still a room for probabilists to escape Achinstein's argument, or so I will argue. More specifically, I will suggest that Achinstein hasn't established that comparative evidential support cannot be understood in terms of probabilistic relevance, since a central premise in what appears to be Achinstein's main argument towards that more specific conclusion is problematic. The premise in question relies on a mistaken assumption.I will not question here what appears to be Achinstein's central claim, namely, that e being evidence that h cannot be fully understood in terms of an increase in probability. This article aims to show that the view that an increase in probabilities entails an increase in comparative support escapes Achinstein's counterexamples. In a sense, then, my proposal amounts to a new conciliatory suggestion. The central intuition from Achinstein's approach might be right. Our common-sense judgements about cases of increase in probability not always amounting to something being evidence that the hypothesis is true might be correct. However, this is not to say that the probabilistic accounts are not interesting and useful tools for thinking about science and some aspects of confirmation and comparative support in particular. What our discussion will show, I hope, is that as long as evidential support in science has anything to do with the ordinary, common-sense understanding of evidential support, being evidentially supported cannot be merely reduced to an increase in probability, even though Achinstein's arguments don't establish that comparative evidential support cannot be understood in terms of probabilistic relevance.In what follows, I first introduce Achin...

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Two-state solution to the lottery paradox

Cited by 4 publications

References 43 publications

Graded epistemic justification

Graded epistemic justification

Strong Belief is Ordinary

Is an Increase in Probability Always an Increase in Evidential Support?

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