Two theories of group agency

Strohmaier, David

doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01290-4

Cited by 22 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 25 publications

(17 reference statements)

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“…According to this approach, "[a]n entity has propositional attitudes, if and only if it has states with the appropriate functional profiles." Where "[f]unctional profiles are the full specification of the causal roles states of a system have to play to realise propositional attitudes" (Strohmaier, 2020(Strohmaier, : 1902(Strohmaier, -1903. However, collective agency is not in of itself enough to make a collective a fitting bearer of responsibility.…”

Section: A Role For Collective Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Autonomous Military Systems: collective responsibility and distributed burdens

Conradie

2023

Ethics Inf Technol

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The introduction of Autonomous Military Systems (AMS) onto contemporary battlefields raises concerns that they will bring with them the possibility of a techno-responsibility gap, leaving insecurity about how to attribute responsibility in scenarios involving these systems. In this work I approach this problem in the domain of applied ethics with foundational conceptual work on autonomy and responsibility. I argue that concerns over the use of AMS can be assuaged by recognising the richly interrelated context in which these systems will most likely be deployed. This will allow us to move beyond the solely individualist understandings of responsibility at work in most treatments of these cases, toward one that includes collective responsibility. This allows us to attribute collective responsibility to the collectives of which the AMS form a part, and to account for the distribution of burdens that follows from this attribution. I argue that this expansion of our responsibility practices will close at least some otherwise intractable techno-responsibility gaps.

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Section: A Role For Collective Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Autonomous Military Systems: collective responsibility and distributed burdens

Conradie

2023

Ethics Inf Technol

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“…DeRose (2000); Gibbons (2006); Goldberg (2017Goldberg ( , 2018andLackey (1999, 2021). 15 Functionalist approaches are defended by Bird (2010), List andPettit (2011) and Strohmaier (2020); interpretationism is defended by List and Pettit (2011) and Tollefsen (2015). 16 A further source of confusion in the case of attributions to groups may arise from a failure to cleanly distinguish between the epistemic position of the group itself and its members.…”

Section: E N D N O T E Smentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1515Functionalist approaches are defended by Bird (2010), List and Pettit (2011) and Strohmaier (2020); interpretationism is defended by List and Pettit (2011) and Tollefsen (2015). …”

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confidence: 99%

Group evidence

Brown

2022

Philosophical Issues

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“…Collectivists, on the other hand, believe that collective attitudes are irreducible and therefore need to be explained by the existence of groups as independent intentional agents. "Agency" is here usually understood in one of the following ways: either interpretationist (groups are agents since they fulfill necessary conditions of being interpreted as such; e.g., List & Pettit, 2011;Tollefsen, 2002) or functionalist (groups are agents since they fulfill the functions identified with intentional agency; e.g., Epstein, 2015;Huebner, 2013;Strohmaier, 2020).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Group Knobe Effect revisited: epistemic and doxastic side-effect effects in intuitive judgments concerning group agents

Tarnowski

Ziółkowski²,

Tałasiewicz³

2022

Synthese

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In this paper, we investigate the effect described in the literature as the Group Knobe Effect, which is an asymmetry in ascription of intentionality of negative and positive side-effects of an action performed by a group agent. We successfully replicate two studies originally conducted by Michael and Szigeti (Philos Explor 22:44–61, 2019), who observed this effect and provide empirical evidence of the existence of two related effects—Group Epistemic and Doxastic Knobe Effects—which show analogous asymmetry with respect to knowledge and belief ascriptions. We explain how the existence of the Group Knobe Effect and its epistemic and doxastic counterparts affects the philosophical debate on collective agency and intentionality and supports the intuitiveness of realism about collective agency among laypeople. We also critically assess the reasoning presented by Michael and Szigeti (2019) in favor of the realist-collectivist interpretation of their results (as opposed to the realist-distributivist interpretation). We argue that a thorough analysis of both their data and our new findings shows a rather wide range of differing intuitions among laypeople regarding the status of groups as agents. These results show that while some laypeople may have realist-collectivist intuitions, the contrary realist-distrubutivist intuitions are also widespread and the claim that the majority of laypeople hold collectivist intuitions regarding group agency is unjustified.

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Two theories of group agency

Cited by 22 publications

References 25 publications

Autonomous Military Systems: collective responsibility and distributed burdens

Autonomous Military Systems: collective responsibility and distributed burdens

Group evidence

The Group Knobe Effect revisited: epistemic and doxastic side-effect effects in intuitive judgments concerning group agents

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