Two Versions of the Extended Mind Thesis

Abstract

According to the Extended Mind thesis, the mind extends beyond the skull or the skin: mental processes can constitutively include external devices, like a computer or a notebook. The Extended Mind thesis has drawn both support and criticism. However, most discussions -including those by its original defenders, Andy Clark and David Chalmers -fail to distinguish between two very different interpretations of this thesis. The first version claims that the physical basis of mental features can be located spatially outside the body. Once we accept that the mind depends on physical events to some extent, this thesis, though not obvious, is compatible with a large variety of views on the mind. The second version applies to standing states only, and has to do with how we conceive the nature of such states. This second version is much more interesting, because it points to a potential tension in our conception of minds or selves. However, without properly distinguishing between the two theses, the significance of the second is obscured by the comparative triviality of the first.

Extended Cognition and Extended Consciousness

“…But there is good reason to doubt that it is the right formulation. This reason has been touched on by various theorists over the years in formulating versions of the thesis, but it has been pressed most forcefully as an objection by Katalin Farkas (2012).…”

“…Perhaps there is something philosophically important about the difference between present technology and future technology, but if so a good formulation of the thesis ought to capture the philosophically important distinction directly. Farkas (2012) suggests articulating a stronger thesis specifically in terms of standing states such as beliefs. Her suggested thesis says that the typical role of standing states can be extended to include to include states that produce conscious manifestations in a somewhat different way than normal beliefs and desires do.…”

Extended Mental Features

“…I argued elsewhere that there is a fairly innocuous sense of "extending" conscious states that is arguably not at issue in the EM debate (Farkas 2012). Imagine that silicon wiring which runs outside the skull can provide a perfect replacement for some neurons that are plausibly part of the material base of some conscious event.…”

Why Internal Moral Enhancement Might Be politically Better than External Moral Enhancement

“…13 And, indeed, many dualists. 14 The EMH is certainly most at home with the functionalist theory, but some have recently argued that a certain version of the EMH is compatible with nearly every theory of mind. See Farkas [14] 15 I use the term mechanistic here in light of the abstract characterisation of mechanistic explanations found in work by philosophers of science like Craver [15].…”

“…14 The EMH is certainly most at home with the functionalist theory, but some have recently argued that a certain version of the EMH is compatible with nearly every theory of mind. See Farkas [14] 15 I use the term mechanistic here in light of the abstract characterisation of mechanistic explanations found in work by philosophers of science like Craver [15]. 16 Jaworski [16] p. 136-140 17 Levy himself notes that others have defended similar views, see Levy [9] and Chalmers's famous Otto-Inga thought experiment.…”