Two visual systems and the feeling of presence

Gangopadhyay, Nivedita; Madary, Michael; Spicer, Finn; Matthen, Mohan

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199551118.003.0007

Cited by 32 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Vishwanath, , p. 174, , p. 232). There is, however, significant evidence that binocular disparity is important for visually‐guided grasping (Watt and Bradshaw, ; for a review see Chinellato and del Pobil, ) – this is in line with Matthen's idea (, ) of a link between FOP, egocentric localization and the perception of action possibilities.…”

Section: Fop and Its Perceptual Cuessupporting

confidence: 58%

“…This idea that FOP depends on the perception of egocentric absolute depth is perfectly compatible with Matthen's account (see , pp. 315–316, ).…”

Section: Fop and Its Perceptual Cuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The fact that for him FOP depends on motion‐guiding vision is not a problem here, if we assume that motion‐guiding vision is the result of interstream functional interaction. And this is possible because he talks about, respectively, descriptive vision and motion‐guiding vision and he clearly specifies that he is not concerned with the anatomical details of these data‐streams, but only with a broad functional difference and the (double) dissociability of these functions (, sect. 5).…”

Section: The Feeling Of Presence and The ‘Two Visual Systems Model’mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…as occupying a portion of the external environment; I literally feel the ‘outside’ presence of that physical object via visual perceptual experience. As Matthen () observes,

When I look down at my hands right now, it looks as if they are working on a black computer keyboard. There is something about my visual state that makes it seem as if the keyboard is really there, and that it is really black.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This focus on ordinary seeing is unproblematic. Even Matthen's claim is about veridical perceptual situations: normal scene vision is actuality‐committing while pictorial vision is not (, pp. 15, 19); thus, Matthen's idea is about ordinary, everyday life visual states (, p. 14), without considering illusions, imagery, dreaming, hallucinations, etc.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Visual Feeling of Presence

Ferretti

2016

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Everyday visual experience constantly confronts us with things we can interact with in the real world. We literally feel the outside presence of physical objects in our environment via visual perceptual experience. The visual feeling of presence is a crucial feature of vision that is largely unexplored in the philosophy of perception, and poorly debated in vision neuroscience. The aim of this article is to investigate the feeling of presence. I suggest that visual feeling of presence depends on the visual representation of a very particular spatial relation with the object we interact with: the visual representation of absolute egocentric depth, which is due to stereoscopic vision.

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Section: Fop and Its Perceptual Cuessupporting

confidence: 58%

“…This idea that FOP depends on the perception of egocentric absolute depth is perfectly compatible with Matthen's account (see , pp. 315–316, ).…”

Section: Fop and Its Perceptual Cuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Feeling Of Presence and The ‘Two Visual Systems Model’mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…as occupying a portion of the external environment; I literally feel the ‘outside’ presence of that physical object via visual perceptual experience. As Matthen () observes,

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Visual Feeling of Presence

Ferretti

2016

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Disjunctivism, hallucinations, and metacognition

Dokic

Martin

2012

WIRES Cognitive Science

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Perceptual experiences have been construed either as representational mental states—Representationalism—or as direct mental relations to the external world—Disjunctivism. Both conceptions are critical reactions to the so‐called ‘Argument from Hallucination’, according to which perceptions cannot be about the external world, since they are subjectively indiscriminable from other, hallucinatory experiences, which are about sense‐data or mind‐dependent entities. Representationalism agrees that perceptions and hallucinations share their most specific mental kind, but accounts for hallucinations as misrepresentations of the external world. According to Disjunctivism, the phenomenal character of perceptions is exhausted by worldly objects and features, and thus must be different from the phenomenal character of hallucinations. Disjunctivism claims that subjective indiscriminability is not the result of a common experiential ground, but is because of our inability to discriminate, from the inside, hallucinations from perceptions. At first sight, Representationalism is more congenial to the way cognitive science deals with perception. However, empirically oriented revisions of Disjunctivism could be developed and tested by giving a metacognitive account of hallucinations. Two versions of this account can be formulated, depending on whether metacognition is understood as explicit metarepresentation or as implicit monitoring of first‐order informational states. The first version faces serious objections, but the second is more promising, as it embodies a more realistic view of perceptual phenomenology as having both sensory and affective aspects. Affect‐based phenomenology is constituted by various metacognitive feelings, such as the feeling of being perceptually confronted with the world itself, rather than with pictures or mere representations. WIREs Cogn Sci 2012 doi: 10.1002/wcs.1190 This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Consciousness

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When Is Now? How Temporally Shifting Dreams Illuminate the Feeling of Pastness

Barkasi

2012

Synthese Library

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Two visual systems and the feeling of presence

Cited by 32 publications

References 8 publications

Visual Feeling of Presence

Visual Feeling of Presence

Disjunctivism, hallucinations, and metacognition

When Is Now? How Temporally Shifting Dreams Illuminate the Feeling of Pastness

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