Two visual systems in Molyneux subjects

Ferretti, G.

doi:10.1007/s11097-017-9533-z

Cited by 19 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 88 publications

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“…The visuomotor transformation is accompanied by a neurophysiological motor simulation of the motor act related to the action properties (Ferretti 2016a: sect. 4, 2017b). This is a form of covert mental action and is a mechanism of motor preparation for potential action that is simultaneously blocked and can be recruited if the person decides to act.…”

Section: The Sharpened Weak Neuroscientific Thesismentioning

confidence: 98%

“…(b) ( Dorsal) Ascription of Action Properties : The dorsal stream also represents depicted objects. There are specific dorsal portions that are responsible, during face-to-face perception, for the visuomotor transformation of an object's geometrical attributes into action properties (anterior intraparietal area) and, then, of action properties into motor commands (the most rostral part of the ventral premotor cortex, named F5; Castiello 2005; Sakata et al 1995; Murata et al 2000; Raos et al 2006; Ferretti 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2017b). The visuomotor transformation is accompanied by a neurophysiological motor simulation of the motor act related to the action properties (Ferretti 2016a: sect.…”

Section: The Sharpened Weak Neuroscientific Thesismentioning

confidence: 99%

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Are Pictures Peculiar Objects of Perception?

Ferretti¹

2017

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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ABSTRACT:Are face-to-face perception and picture perception different perceptual phenomena? The question is controversial. On the one hand, philosophers have offered several solid arguments showing that, despite some resemblances, they are quite different perceptual phenomena and that pictures are special objects of perception. On the other hand, neuroscientists routinely use pictures in experimental settings as substitutes for normal objects, and this practice is successful in explaining how the human visual system works. But this seems to imply that face-to-face perception and picture perception are very similar, if not actually the same. How can we decide between these two opposite intuitions? Here I offer a regimentation of the notion of picture perception that can reconcile these two apparently conflicting ideas about pictures. It follows that philosophers and neuroscientists can maintain their respective stances without any theoretical conflict.

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Section: The Sharpened Weak Neuroscientific Thesismentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: The Sharpened Weak Neuroscientific Thesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Are Pictures Peculiar Objects of Perception?

Ferretti¹

2017

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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“…Neurophysiology of vision suggests, indeed, that there is no rigid functional separation between the visual paths at various points in the processing (Jacob and Jeannerod 2003: p. 255;Briscoe 2009;Chinellato and Del Pobil 2016;Ferretti 2016b;Borra et al 2007;Cisek and Kalaska 2010;Hoshi and Tanji 2007;Schenk and McIntosh 2010). Moreover, a more accurate analysis of optic ataxia and visual agnosia reveals that such impairments do not reflect dissociation in vision for action and visual recognition as strong and clear-cut as originally thought (Rossetti et al 2003(Rossetti et al , 2005Blangero et al 2007), for philosophical discussion see (Briscoe 2009;Briscoe and Schwenkler 2015;Clark 2007;Ferretti 2017b).…”

Section: The 'Interactionist Hypothesis'mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There are aspects of action that do not require conscious supervision. However, it seems that dissociation between conscious vision and motoric performance is due to several factors, as whether the action automatic or slow, whether it is performed by a skilled agent or by a novel one and whether it is directed to objects in the peripheral rather central portion of the visual field, as also a discussion of cases of optic ataxia and visual agnosia suggest (Briscoe and Schwenkler 2015;Briscoe 2009;Ferretti 2017b).…”

Section: The Assumption Of Experience-based Selection (Ebs): Conscioumentioning

confidence: 99%

Between vision and action: introduction to the special issue

Ferretti

Caiani

2019

Synthese

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The study of the mind is quite a universe. Within this universe, we find the world of perception. Those who have landed in this world know that this is a place of wonderful and breathtaking landscapes. Among the landscapes, we can find within the world of perception, there is one we have to fear most: the jungle between vision and action. Two main kinds of adventurers are brave enough to pursue the routes in this jungle: the philosopher and the neuroscientist. This special issue is a logbook of this trip along the insidious and marvelous pathways between vision and action.

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“…See, e.g.,Clark (2001;,Dijkerman et al (2009), Ferretti (2016a; 2016b; 2017; forthcoming),Jacob and Jeannerod (2003),Kozuch (2015),Mole (2009),Wu (2014), Zipoli Caiani andFerretti (2017).…”

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confidence: 99%

Are visuomotor representations cognitively penetrable? Biasing action-guiding vision

Toribio

2018

Synthese

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Is action-guiding vision cognitively penetrable? More specifically, is the visual processing that guides our goal-directed actions sensitive to semantic information from cognitive states? This paper critically examines a recent family of arguments whose aim is to challenge a widespread and influential view in philosophy and cognitive science: the view that action-guiding vision is cognitively impenetrable. I argue, in response, that while there may very well be top-down causal influences on action-guiding vision, they should not be taken to be an instance of cognitive penetration. Assuming otherwise is to assign a computational role to the influencing states that they cannot perform. Although questions about cognitive penetrability are ultimately empirical, the issues addressed in this paper are largely philosophical. The discussion here highlights an important set of considerations that help better understand the relations between cognition, vision, and action.

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Two visual systems in Molyneux subjects

Cited by 19 publications

References 88 publications

Are Pictures Peculiar Objects of Perception?

Are Pictures Peculiar Objects of Perception?

Between vision and action: introduction to the special issue

Are visuomotor representations cognitively penetrable? Biasing action-guiding vision

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