Two Ways to Put Knowledge First

Jackson, Alexander

doi:10.1080/00048402.2011.587438

Cited by 16 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…But that is not all. 38 For more on the view that knowledge is the aim of belief, see Williamson (2000, p.11), Bird (2007, McHugh (2011), Smithies (2012), and Jackson (2012). 39 While Jackson (2012) and Smithies (2012) defend theories much like the Teleological Account, my arguments will be independent of theirs.…”

Section: The Teleological Accountmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…Many who defend parts of the Knowledge Account explicitly rely on the view that Gettier cases exist-most prominently, Williamson (2000). 23 For criticisms in the same vein, see Jackson (2012), Smithies (2012), Cohen and Comesaña (2013), and Turri (2014). 24 Williamson (2013a) and (2013b) defends this view.…”

Section: The Deontological Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… While Jackson () and Smithies () defend theories much like the Teleological Account, my arguments will be independent of theirs. Smithies argues from the principle that one has justification to act in a certain way iff one has justification to believe that it is correct to act in that way.…”

mentioning

confidence: 97%

“… For more on the view that knowledge is the aim of belief, see Williamson (, p.11), Bird (), McHugh (), Smithies (), and Jackson (). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion, Action, and Belief: A Teleological Account

Mehta

2015

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Here I advance a unified account of the structure of the epistemic normativity of assertion, action, and belief. According to my Teleological Account, all of these are epistemically successful just in case they fulfill the primary aim of knowledgeability, an aim which in turn generates a host of secondary epistemic norms. The central features of the Teleological Account are these: it is compact in its reliance on a single central explanatory posit, knowledge‐centered in its insistence that knowledge sets the fundamental epistemic norm, and yet fiercely pluralistic in its acknowledgment of the legitimacy and value of a rich range of epistemic norms distinct from knowledge. Largely in virtue of this pluralist character, I argue, the Teleological Account is far superior to extant knowledge‐centered accounts.

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Section: The Teleological Accountmentioning

confidence: 96%

Section: The Deontological Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 97%

“… For more on the view that knowledge is the aim of belief, see Williamson (, p.11), Bird (), McHugh (), Smithies (), and Jackson (). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion, Action, and Belief: A Teleological Account

Mehta

2015

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“… Jackson () endorses this reading of the knowledge norm of belief and rejects interpretation (i) on the grounds that it places too strong constraints on rationality.…”

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confidence: 99%

Is it Safe to Disagree?

Hirvelä

2016

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This paper offers a new account of the epistemic significance of disagreement which is grounded in two assumptions; (i) that knowledge is the norm of belief and, (ii) that the safety condition is a necessary condition for knowledge. These assumptions motivate a modal definition of epistemic peerhood, which is much easier to operate on than the more traditional definitions of epistemic peerhood. The modal account of the epistemic significance of disagreement yields plausible results regarding cases of disagreement. Furthermore, it is able to tap into the intuitions that have motivated the conformist and the nonconformist positions and it locates a fruitful middle-ground between these two conflicting positions. It will be shown that the conformist is correct in that cases of real peer disagreement force us to suspend our judgment. The reason for this is that in cases of real peer disagreement our beliefs fail to be safe. The nonconformist, on the other hand, is right in that disagreement in itself does not have any epistemic power. It is only by the grace of nature that we gain knowledge. The fact that someone disagrees with you does not mean that you do not have knowledge.

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Spotting When Algorithms Are Wrong

Buijsman

Veluwenkamp

2022

Minds & Machines

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Users of sociotechnical systems often have no way to independently verify whether the system output which they use to make decisions is correct; they are epistemically dependent on the system. We argue that this leads to problems when the system is wrong, namely to bad decisions and violations of the norm of practical reasoning. To prevent this from occurring we suggest the implementation of defeaters: information that a system is unreliable in a specific case (undercutting defeat) or independent information that the output is wrong (rebutting defeat). Practically, we suggest to design defeaters based on the different ways in which a system might produce erroneous outputs, and analyse this suggestion with a case study of the risk classification algorithm used by the Dutch tax agency.

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Two Ways to Put Knowledge First

Abstract: This is an electronic version of an article published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90(2). Australasian Journal of Philosophy is available online at: www.tandfonline.com.

Cited by 16 publications

References 9 publications

Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion, Action, and Belief: A Teleological Account

Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion, Action, and Belief: A Teleological Account

Is it Safe to Disagree?

Spotting When Algorithms Are Wrong

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