Tying Up the Loose Ends of National Self-Determination: British, French, and American Experts in Peace Planning, 1917–1919

Abstract

This article examines Allied peace planning during the latter stages of the First World War by comparing and connecting the British, French, and American expert groups. These academic experts were expected to apply the publicly announced programme of national self-determination to the local realities in Europe without losing sight of their governments’ geopolitical directives. Contacts and exchanges between the three groups, largely neglected in the literature, played a crucial role in shaping the experts’ work. At the same time, persisting national suspicion and the fragile institutional position of the experts prevented open debate on the precise meaning of national self-determination and thereby forestalled the development of a coherent Allied peace programme. This shortcoming would become a serious burden for the negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference and the early interwar period, in that it led to growing frustration and undermined Allied commitment to the Paris peace treaties.

The Paris System in Western Europe: Minorities, Self-Determination, and the Management of Difference in the “Civilized West”

“…While some argued that Wilson had expressed his unequivocal support for a "pure and simple" return of the provinces to France, others noted that Wilson's eighth point did not exclude the need to carry out a plebiscite. 6 Consequently, the French stepped up their lobbying with American and British policymakers and experts until the end of the war (Ter Minassian 1997;Young 2004;Fischer 2014;Prott 2014). These efforts were successful in convincing the French allies to support the French war aim publicly and take it off the agenda at the Paris Peace Conference.…”