Type-Ambiguous Names

Abstract

The orthodox view of proper names, Millianism, provides a very simple and elegant explanation of the semantic contribution (and semantic properties) of referential uses of names, namely names that occur as bare singulars and as the argument of a predicate. However, one problem for Millianism is that it cannot explain the semantic contribution of predicative uses of names (as in e.g. 'there are two Alberts in my class'). In recent years, an alternative view, socalled The-Predicativism, has become increasingly popular. According to The-Predicativists, names are uniformly count nouns. This straightforwardly explains why names can be used predicatively, but is prima facie less congenial to an analysis of referential uses. To address this issue, The-Predicativists argue that referential names are in fact complex determiner phrases consisting of a covert definite determiner and a count noun-and so, a referential name is a (covert) definite description. In this paper, I will argue that despite the appearance of increased theoretical complexity, the view that names are ambiguous between predicative and referential types is in fact superior to the unitary The-Predicativist view. However, I will also argue that to see why this (type) ambiguity view is better, we need to give up the standard Millian analysis. Consequently, I will first propose an alternative analysis of referential names that (a) retains the virtues of Millianism, but (b) provides an important explanatory connection to the predicative uses. Once this analysis of names is adopted, the explanation for why names are systematically ambiguous between referential and predicative types is both simple and elegant. Second, I will argue that The-Predicativism has the appearance of being simpler than an ambiguity view, but is in fact unable to account for certain key properties of referential names without making ad hoc stipulations.

No Name: The Allosemy View

“… Our view contrasts with the approach defended by Schoubye (). He claims that the condition that N is called N is part of the character of proper names.…”

“…As said, it is an important gap that referential bare names do not pluralize. It is a problem for most predicativists, but also for Schoubye (, see footnote 20) who claims that proper names are just pronouns with a semantic presupposition connected to the metalinguistic fact that the individual picked‐up by the pronoun is named in such and such a way. Third person pronouns obviously pluralize (cf.…”

On the Literal Meaning of Proper Names

“…(elbourne 2002, p. 225) matushansky (2008) incorporates a variable for naming conventions in the lexical entry for proper names, which behaves extensionally in referential uses. Fara, in turn, argues that bare occurrences of proper names in argument position are incomplete definite descriptions, and those are rigid in context (that is, they might change they reference in context, but once the referent is fixed, they behave rigidly) I basically agree with Schoubye's (2016) arguments against these proposals. on the one hand, elbourne and matushansky's strategy of introducing a variable which behaves extensionally only in referential cases seems ad hoc.…”

“…Do all Johns have the same name, or are there many different Johns, say, John 1 , John 2 , John 3 … and so on? According to the former view, proper names resemble indexicals (recanati 1993, Pelczar and rainsbury 1998) or pronouns (Schoubye 2016), since their semantic value varies with context. According to the latter view we have a different lexical entry for each John, so reference is stable.…”

“… See Saab and lo Guercio (2018) for further discussion. AlsoHornsby (1976), leckie (2013) andSchoubye (2016). 6 This is not the only way of characterizing the view though: indexicalists hold that proper names work like variables for individuals (see recanati 1993,Pelczar & rainsbury 1998, Cumming 1998and Schoubye 2016, although on an indexicalist account the point above remains the same.…”