Type-Based Analysis of Protected Storage in the TPM

Shao, Jianxiong; Feng, Dan; Qin, Yu

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-02726-5_11

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 10 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Related Work. A few researches have been done for the formal analysis and verification of the TPM 2.0 specifications on direct anonymous attestation [13,14], protected storage [15], and the traditional HMAC-based authorization [16]. However, there are no results about the formal verification of TPM 2.0 EA mechanism as far as we know.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Formal Analysis of Enhanced Authorization in the TPM 2.0

Shao

Qin

Feng

et al. 2015

Proceedings of the 10th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a system component that provides a hardware-based approach to establish trust in a platform by providing protected storage, robust platform integrity measurement, secure platform attestation and other secure functionalities. The access to TPM commands and TPM-resident key objects are protected via an authorization mechanism. Enhanced Authorization (EA) is a new mechanism introduced by the TPM 2.0 to provide a rich authorization model for specifying flexible access control policies for TPM-resident objects.In our paper, we conduct a formal verification of the EA mechanism. Firstly, we propose a model of the TPM 2.0 EA mechanism in a variant of the applied pi calculus. Secondly, we identify and formalize the security properties of the EA mechanism (Prop.1 and 2) in its design. We also give out a misuse problem that is easily to be neglected (Lemma 7). Thirdly, using the SAPIC tool and the tamarin prover, we have verified both the two security properties. Meanwhile, we have found 3 misuse cases and one of them leads to an attack on the application in [12].

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Formal Analysis of Enhanced Authorization in the TPM 2.0

Shao

Qin

Feng

et al. 2015

Proceedings of the 10th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Although many types of research have been done for the analysis of the TPM2.0 specification on direct anonymous attestation [14, 15], protected storage [16, 17], and enhanced authorisation [18], few works have been done on TPM2.0 HMAC authorisation mechanism. In [19], the authors provide a proof of the HMAC authorisation protocols in a computational model.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Formal analysis of HMAC authorisation in the TPM2.0 specification

Shao

Qin

Feng

2018

IET Information Security

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…同时还针对 TPM 2.0 技术规范草案中所采纳的 DAA 协议接口进行了安全分析 [12] , 突破性地发现 TPM [14] . 密钥存储安全方面, 采用类型系统的方法对密钥存储保护进行分析, 利用定理证明方法证明了 TPM 2.0 密钥层次保护功能是安全的 [15] . 密钥协商方面, 我们在 CK 模型下分析了 TPM 2.0 的两阶段密钥协商 API 接口, 发现密钥协商存在一定的安全隐患, 攻击者可利用暴露的中间 Z 值实施 UKS (unknown key share) 和 KCI (key-compromise impersonation) 攻击 [16] .…”

unclassified