Typed behavioural equivalences for processes in the presence of subtyping

Hennessy, Matthew; Rathke, Julian

doi:10.1016/s1571-0661(04)00309-3

Cited by 37 publications

(87 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Following [15], the (If) rule exploits the equality between u and v to refine the types of the two values in the typing for the then branch. The notation Γ u : V indicates the environment Γ, u :…”

Section: The Type Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secrecy and Authenticity Types for Secure Distributed Messaging

Bugliesi

Calzavara

Macedonio

2010

Automated Reasoning for Security Protocol Analysis and Issues in the Theory of Security

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Abstract. We introduce a calculus with mobile names, distributed principals and primitives for secure remote communication, without any reference to explicit cryptography. The calculus is equipped with a system of types and effects providing static guarantees of secrecy and authenticity in the presence of a Dolev-Yao intruder. The novelty with respect to existing type systems for security is in the structure of our secrecy and authenticity types, which are inspired by the formulas of BAN Logic, and retain much of the simplicity and intuitive reading of such formulas. Drawing on these types, the type system makes it possible to characterize authenticity directly as a property of the data exchanged during a protocol rather than indirectly by extracting and interpreting the effects the protocol has on that data.

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Section: The Type Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secrecy and Authenticity Types for Secure Distributed Messaging

Bugliesi

Calzavara

Macedonio

2010

Automated Reasoning for Security Protocol Analysis and Issues in the Theory of Security

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“…Bound names in output labels denote scope extruded names whereas bound names in input labels denote fresh names introduced by the (implicit) observer. These three transitions are defined inductively by the rules given in Table 7 and Table 8, inspired by [9,8,4], but with a number of differences.…”

Section: Action (ñ :T)l : A?(v)mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Theory for Observational Fault Tolerance

Francalanza

Hennessy

2006

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…Syntax synchronous 1 , monadic, calculus with the match/mismatch operator. As explained in [12], the matching construct is essential for the coinductive characterization of the reduction barbed congruence shown in Section 3.…”

Section: The Languagementioning

confidence: 99%

“…We define typed equivalences for the π-calculus relative to an observation level σ, namely σ-reduction barbed congruences (see [12]). Two processes P, Q are σ-equivalent in the type environment Γ , written Γ P ∼ =σ Q, if they exhibit the same σ-level behaviour, i.e., they are indistinguishable for a σ-level observer.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Theory of Noninterference for the π-Calculus

Crafa

Rossi

2005

Trustworthy Global Computing

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Abstract. We develop a theory of noninterference for a typed version of the π-calculus where types are used to assign secrecy levels to channels. We provide two equivalent characterizations of noninterference based on a typed behavioural equivalence relative to a security level σ, which captures the idea of external observers of level σ. The first characterization involves a universal quantification over all the possible active attacks, i.e., malicious processes which interact with the system possibly leaking secret information. The second definition of noninterference is expressed in terms of an unwinding condition, which deals with so-called passive attacks trying to infer confidential information just by observing the behaviour of the system. This unwinding-based characterization naturally leads to efficient methods for the verification and construction of (compositional) secure systems. Furthermore, we characterize noninterference in terms of bisimulation-like (partial) equivalence relations in the style of a stream of similar studies for other process calculi (e.g., CCS and CryptoSPA) and languages (e.g., imperative and multi-threaded languages).

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Typed behavioural equivalences for processes in the presence of subtyping

Cited by 37 publications

References 20 publications

Secrecy and Authenticity Types for Secure Distributed Messaging

Secrecy and Authenticity Types for Secure Distributed Messaging

A Theory for Observational Fault Tolerance

A Theory of Noninterference for the π-Calculus

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