U.S. Security Assistance in the Middle East: Helping Friends or Creating Enemies?

Jett, Dennis C.

doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2011.00474.x

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…They claim that the US has overstated the threat of al-Qaeda and its affiliates and that SFA operations are a poor use of defense dollars and ineffective in developing long-term partner capacity. 57 Additionally, his overall critique discounts the threat of al-Qaeda and its affiliates, repeats the often mentioned, but rarely quantified statement that US involvement abroad, " … will increase rather than diminish, threats to America's security" 61 and offers that in many cases concerning US engagement within failed or failing states that, "the best course of action is to do nothing at all." 62 Doing nothing, while always an option, might lead to a loss of initiative in the fight against al-Qaeda and place partner nations, and potentially the US, at greater risk.…”

Section: Advantages Of Sfa Operationsmentioning

confidence: 95%

The US Army and Future Security Force Assistance Operations

McAteer¹

2013

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The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)xx-04-2013 REPORT TYPE CIVILIAN RESEARCH PROJECT .33 DATES COVERED (From -To) TITLE AND SUBTITLEThe US Army and Future Security Force Assistance Operations 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER AUTHOR(S)Colonel Timothy J. McAteer United States Army 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)Dr. Jason Lyall Jackson Institute for Global Affairs-Yale University PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)Dr. Tami Biddle U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013 SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENTDistribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTESWord Count: 10,033 ABSTRACTal-Qaeda and its affiliates remain a threat to the US and US interests abroad. Their consistent expansion into failed and failing states and other ungoverned regions creates potential safe havens from which the organization can plan and prepare future operations. This paper proposes that Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations represent an enduring approach to denying safe haven to transnational terror organizations like al-Qaeda, by developing the capabilities of partner nation security forces to control activities within their borders and secure their populations. SFA also presents an opportunity for increased employment of Regionally Aligned, US Army Conventional Forces in support of security cooperation efforts. This paper provides a summary of the threat and the conditions of failing states and safe havens. It addresses the recent evolution of SFA doctrine, guidance and authorities, and the role of interagency cooperation related to the future operating environment and security assistance missions. The paper argues that SFA is a relevant military approach and not at odds with historic foreign military assistance efforts. It concludes with recommendations for organizing and training Conventional Force SFA units. This current strategy against al-Qaeda, based heavily...

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Section: Advantages Of Sfa Operationsmentioning

confidence: 95%

The US Army and Future Security Force Assistance Operations

McAteer¹

2013

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Medio Oriente: inestabilidad y crisis del orden regional

Rodríguez

2021

EAA

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En las últimas dos décadas, la situación de la seguridad y la estabilidad política en Medio Oriente ha sufrido un grave deterioro que contrasta con la importancia estratégica de la región como motor energético de la economía mundial. El objetivo del presente artículo es aportar un enfoque interpretativo general que contribuya a la explicación de esa contradictoria evolución a partir del análisis de un conjunto de factores exógenos y endógenos que han ejercido de manera primordial, aunque no limitativa, un efecto perturbador sobre el orden regional desde finales del siglo XX y que ayudan a entender las causas del caos geopolítico en que parece inmerso el Medio Oriente en los albores del presente siglo.

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Why Did State-Building Policy Fail in Afghanistan?

Rodríguez¹

2023

OJPS

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Afghan state collapse in August 2021 once again put discussion about state-building strategies in post-conflict scenarios. This article explores fundamental causes of state-building failure in Afghanistan and proposes an explanation based, for one side, on policy inability to generate internal legitimacy and local ownership necessary for State consolidation and sustainability born from military intervention in 2001; and for the other, in how war on terror interest vitiated Afghan transition course by subordinating democratic governance and economic reconstruction goals to security considerations. In this sense, article focuses its attention on three fundamental issues that ultimately doomed 20-year effort of state-building to failure: the way in which new state foundations were distorted to turn it into a neo-patrimonial pseudo-democracy, dependent and corrupt, and controlled it by an old and new warlords elite; the absence of a national reconstruction effective strategy for helping Afghan people to rebuild a country devastated by years of war, that would allow socializing peace benefits and strengthen central government authority in a traditionally fragmented and centrifugal society; and lastly, the geopolitical environment also generated by war on terror, which was not contribute to peace and stability in Afghanistan and increased state-building shortcomings and failure chances.

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U.S. Security Assistance in the Middle East: Helping Friends or Creating Enemies?

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

The US Army and Future Security Force Assistance Operations

The US Army and Future Security Force Assistance Operations

Medio Oriente: inestabilidad y crisis del orden regional

Why Did State-Building Policy Fail in Afghanistan?

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