Überprüfung des Zusammenhangs von Eigenschaften, Aufgaben und Vergütung von Aufsichtsräten deutscher Unternehmen

Arnegger, Martin; Hofmann, Christian

doi:10.1007/bf03372906

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 62 publications

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“…Therefore, the calculation shows whether remuneration varies over time, between board members and between companies. The total variance of payment is decomposed into the variances between the years of observation, between the board members, and between the companies (Arnegger and Hoffmann 2014). For this purpose, the inter-class correlation (ICC) is calculated, which indicates the level of correlation of the dependent variables within level 2 and between level 3 (level 3 ICC) or within level 1 and between level 2 (level 2 ICC).…”

Section: Level 3 Model (Company Level)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Does a gender pay gap exist on executive boards? An empirical multilevel analysis of executive board compensation in German listed companies

Handschumacher

2022

J Bus Econ

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Using a three-stage multilevel model, this paper investigates whether the compensation of female and male members of top management teams differs systematically. For this, the payment and the determinants of compensation of approximately 600 executive board members of German DAX, MDAX, and SDAX companies in the years 2016–2019 were analysed. The differences in remuneration are theoretically founded at the company level by agency theory and at the individual level by human capital theory. The empirical results show that women receive lower compensation than men on average throughout the period under review. However, these differences in pay are especially attributable to the fact that women serve on average for a shorter period on the executive board and rarely hold the CEO position. There is also evidence that executive compensation depends directly on individual attributes (length of service on and position in the board) and company-specific characteristics (firm size and performance) that differ systematically between men and women, but gender determines compensation only indirectly through these factors. The study also confirms that women are still underrepresented on executive boards. With these results, this paper contributes to corporate governance research in the context of the dualistic board system and encourages the discussion about women in leadership positions.

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Section: Level 3 Model (Company Level)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Does a gender pay gap exist on executive boards? An empirical multilevel analysis of executive board compensation in German listed companies

Handschumacher

2022

J Bus Econ

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“…If there are a limited number of qualified directors, those with the highest reputation will be appointed to the boards of multiple firms (Loderer and Peyer, 2002). This allocation mechanism provides an incentive to enhance their reputation (Arnegger and Hofmann, 2014) and to obtain multiple board seats (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Firms benefit from this pressure on supervisors, as they are compelled to meet expectations to avoid a decline in their reputation (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998).…”

Section: Monitoring Effectivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do board interlocks support monitoring effectiveness?

Handschumacher

Behrmann

Ceschinski

et al. 2019

MRR

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Purpose This paper aims to investigate the relationship between board interlocks and monitoring effectiveness for listed German companies in a context of risk governance. While agency-theory and resource-dependence-theory suggest a positive association between board interlocks and monitoring effectiveness, reasons such as limited temporal resources of busy board members may suggest a negative association. Design/methodology/approach By using panel data regression, the authors examined the association between board interlocks and monitoring effectiveness, which was approximated by excessive management compensation, pay-for-performance-sensitivity and CEO turnover-performance-sensitivity. The data set comprises 3,998 directorships for 132 listed German companies covering the period 2015-2017. Findings The authors find that board interlocks are associated with not only a more excessive management pay and less performance-sensitive turnover but also a higher pay-for-performance-sensitivity. Originality/value The study examines the impact of multiple directorships based on a German panel data set that includes both multiple appointments of members to national supervisory boards and all other appointments to national and international executive and supervisory bodies. The authors compile three measures to operationalize monitoring effectiveness.

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