1997
DOI: 10.1080/00014788.1997.9729545
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UK Shareholders' Lost Access to Management Information

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Cited by 7 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…As one of the most important corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structure is likely to influence corporate information disclosure in a number of ways. For example, given dispersed ownership structures, such as those in US and UK firms, there is a high demand for public disclosure of high-quality corporate information for the purpose of monitoring the management (Pratt and Storrar 1997). In contrast, German and French firms typically have a concentrated ownership structure, and controlling shareholders (blockholders) rely on insider monitoring mechanisms to obtain corporate information.…”
Section: Literature Review and Hypotheses Developmentsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As one of the most important corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structure is likely to influence corporate information disclosure in a number of ways. For example, given dispersed ownership structures, such as those in US and UK firms, there is a high demand for public disclosure of high-quality corporate information for the purpose of monitoring the management (Pratt and Storrar 1997). In contrast, German and French firms typically have a concentrated ownership structure, and controlling shareholders (blockholders) rely on insider monitoring mechanisms to obtain corporate information.…”
Section: Literature Review and Hypotheses Developmentsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In particular, they often focus on past results and short‐term objectives, which do little to monitor the consistency of medium and long‐term goals at different levels within network organisations. As a result the gap between the general target of owner/shareholders' wealth and the goals actually pursued within organisations becomes wider (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993; Douglas, 1992; Watson and Head, 1998), as indicated in Figure 1, where the two “tiers” of shareholders to corporate (Frankforter et al , 2000; Pratt and Storrar, 1997) and area/corporate to unit principal/agent problem (Young et al , 2000; Rindova, 1999) are also shown.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The private Acts of Parliament that established and regulated the canal companies said little about the financial documents that they should produce and, until the 1830s, “rarely made any provision for the publication or audit of financial statements”. Instead, they tended to stress the rights of shareholders to inspect the company's books (Pratt and Storrar, 1997, p. 207; Forrester, 1998, p. 65) and many specified that company books should be available at shareholders' meetings for that purpose (Edwards, 1989, p. 159). The demarcation between information available to management, and that disclosed to shareholders, between record‐keeping and financial reporting, was therefore less clear‐cut in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries than in the modern era.…”
Section: The Data Set Of Canal Company Financial Statementsmentioning
confidence: 99%