Ukraine and Russia: Legacies of the Imperial past and Competing Memories

Abstract

a b s t r a c tThe legacy of the tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union is one of the crucial factors for an understanding and an explanation of current affairs in the post-Soviet space. This is especially true for Ukraine and for Russian-Ukrainian relations. Russia regards Ukraine as a part of its own strategic orbit, while many Ukrainians want to liberate themselves from the Russian hegemony and advocate a closer cooperation with the European Union. This controversy culminated in late 2013, when Russian pressure led to a re-orientation of Ukrainian policy and a rapprochement with Russia. In this paper I present some reflections on the significance of the imperial heritage for the Russian-Ukrainian relationship. I analyse the different discourses and the Ukrainian and Russian historical narratives, politics of history and competing memories. The Russian-Ukrainian relationship was and is still characterized by an obvious asymmetry, a hegemony of Russia over Ukraine. Russia uses the Orthodox Church and the traditional dominance of the Russian language as instruments for its policy. Not only Russian historians, but also politicians and even the Russian President try to impose the imperial narrative on Ukraine. They are supported by a significant part of Ukrainians, who adhere to the ideal of a common Russia-led Orthodox East Slavic world. Other Ukrainian historians and politicians use the Ukrainian language and the Ukrainian historical narrative with its national myths of liberty and of Ukraine's closeness to Europe in their struggle against the Russian hegemony. The on-going "War of memories" is of special interest. Both sides use and abuse history as a political weapon, and the controversies about the heritage of Kievan Rus', the interpretation of Mazepa, the Holodomor and WW II are not only academic, but also political issues. They reflect the struggle over the geopolitical and cultural orientation of Ukraine which is of crucial importance for the future development of the post-Soviet space and of Eastern Europe.

Navigating contested memories in a commercialised setting: conflict avoidance strategies in Kyiv city tour guiding

“…The legacy of the medieval Kievan state is predominantly interpreted as the cradle of Russian civilisation in Russia. In the official Ukrainian interpretation it is presented as an early version of a flourishing Ukrainian state, the development of which was merely interrupted by Russian and Soviet rule (Kappeler 2014). The Cossack insurgence of the mid-17th century that ended with a military pact between the Zaporizhian Cossacks and Muscovy was widely portrayed as the reunification of Ukrainians and Russians in Russian and Soviet history pedagogics (Shnirelman 2009) but has been interpreted as a temporary solution in the long lasting struggle for liberation in independent Ukraine.…”

Identity and Geopolitics: Ukraine's Grappling With Imperial Legacies

“…48 For Russia, Tolz observed a decade after the Soviet Union's disintegration, reconsidering its past and present relationship with Ukraine remains "arguably the most problematic part of the construction of a new national identity," a construction that will "take decades." 49 For "the large majority of patriots, chauvinistic nationalists, or simply deeply insecure Soviet citizens," an independent Ukraine was "a monster, an illegitimate bastard that ought to be led back to the family dinner table as soon as possible." 50 "For openly or latently neo-imperial Russians," Ukraine constitutes "the most important 'loss.'"…”

Legitimering gjennom (selektiv) felles fortid: russisk bruk av historie i Ukraina-konflikten

“…Wilson (1995) beskrev for 20 år siden hvordan historiske myter ble brukt i politisk uenighet mellom Ukraina og Russland om Donbas-regionen, og det samme gjaldt diskusjonene rundt Krim rett etter uavhengigheten (Marples & Duke 1995). Kappeler (2014) publiserte tidlig i 2014 en artikkel om historie som politisk våpen mellom ukrainere og russere, men da basert på tiden før den nåvaerende konflikten. Kappeler (2014: 112) beskrev den historiske arven som «det mest kontroversielle temaet i det russisk-ukrainske forholdet».…”

“…Historiebruken har imidlertid ikke en entydig funksjon: Mens referansene til Krim passer inn i det som Wilson (1995) beskriver som betydningsfulle «historiske myter», er de historiske referansene ellers mer kontekstuelle og ikke like sterkt knyttet til russisk identitet. Imidlertid passer de inn i en trend flere har påpekt i Russland, hvor historien «bearbeides» og brukes mer aktivt som et politisk virkemiddel (Miller 2012;Kappeler 2014). De ulike formene for politisk historiebruk i Ukraina drøftes avslutningsvis.…”

“…Når utenriksminister Lavrov intervjues på russisk TV eller UD uttaler seg på nasjonale pressekonferanser, er budskapet heller primaert rettet mot russere. Det har også vaert 55 Begrepet er hentet fra Kappeler 2014. påfallende at de historiske mytene som trekkes frem Á om brorskapet, og om andre verdenskrig Á er en del av retorikken til både UD og Putin.…”