Ukrainian National Issue in the Emerging U.S. Strategy Towards the Soviet Union (1946 – 1953)

Abstract

The purpose of the article is to reveal the consideration of the Ukrainian national issue in designing and implementing the U.S. postwar strategy towards the Soviet Union at the outbreak of the Cold War, under the presidency of Harry Truman. Methodology. This is qualitative empirical research, based on a critical analysis of primary and secondary sources. The research topic is studied against the background of developments of the international situation after World War II, which influenced the shaping of the U.S. post-war strategy towards the USSR, as well as the development of anti-Soviet armed resistance in the western part of Ukraine, and Ukrainian Americans’ efforts to use the new international situation in Ukrainian national interests. The scientific novelty of the research consists in the coverage of a topic that has not been sufficiently studied, and in the introduction of new primary sources for this purpose. Conclusions. The postwar U.S. foreign policy strategy was driven by Soviet expansionism, and a threat of a new world war. The American Government began to consider the Ukrainian national issue in designing the post-war strategy towards the USSR because of three major factors: the heroic struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in the western part of Ukraine; the willingness of the representatives of Ukrainian political émigré with close ties to the UPA to cooperate with the U.S. intelligence, and the activities of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, aimed at obtaining American Government’s assistance and support for Ukrainians in Europe. In 1946–1951, the representatives of some Ukrainian émigré groups were involved in gathering intelligence about Soviet military capabilities and intentions, and in operations to root out Soviet agents among Displaced Persons in Germany. In 1949–1951, the CIA parachuted the Ukrainian couriers, trained as wireless operators, into the western part of Ukraine to collect intelligence and to organize a network of active resistance behind the Soviet lines in case of the new world war. U.S. intelligence cooperated mostly with the most moderate group of Ukrainian political émigré – the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council. After this strategy had failed, the U.S. Government focused on the development of a psychological warfare strategy. One of the components of its implementation was the foundation of Prolog Research and Publishing Association (1952) with CIA assistance. However, the understanding of the importance of the Ukrainian national factor in the U.S. «Soviet» strategy was only emerging.