Ukrainians as Russia’s negative ‘other’: History comes full circle

Abstract

The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, euphemistically called the “Ukraine crisis,” draws attention to its ideological underpinnings that include a historically informed Russian hegemonic view of Ukrainians as “younger brothers” who should be both patronized and censured for improper behavior. The paper examines a particular aspect of this superior attitude as embedded in ethnic stereotypes – both “vernacular”, primarily in folklore, and ideologically constructed, in both cultural and political discourses. In both cases, the structure of stereotypes reflects the dominant position of one group and subjugated position of the other within a more general paradigm of relations between Robinson Crusoe and Friday. A peculiar dialectics implies that a “good” Friday can be civilized and assimilated and become almost equal to Crusoe – “almost the same people”, in a popular Russian parlance about Ukrainians. Yet, a “bad” (“wrong”) Friday should be strongly reviled and thoroughly demonized as a complete evil, manipulated allegedly by hostile (“Western”) Robinsons. The paper argues that the Russo-Ukrainian relations cannot be normalized until Russians learn to see Ukrainians as neither “good” nor “bad” but just different eas all the people around.

Legacies of Stalin or Putin? Public Opinion and Historical Memory in Ukraine

“…In Ukraine, contemporary appraisals of Stalin’s rule are not only explained by recollection and salience past experiences, but by how people relate to today’s Russia under Vladimir Putin, who has used the power of Russian state media to engage in historical revisionism on a grand scale to justify expansionist policies. This has included a revitalization of Stalin’s legacy as a liberator of Ukraine from Nazi Germany, with parallels drawn between the Soviet struggle against the Nazis and modern-day Ukrainian opposition groups (Bernhard and Kubik 2016; Edele 2017; Koposov, 2017; Nelson, 2015; Peisakhin and Rozenas 2018; Wood 2011; Snegovaya 2015; Riabchuk 2016; Reese 2018; Vujacic 2007). 15…”

“…Stalin’s legacy has also been the subject of a great deal of contentious revisionism in neighboring Russia (Bernhard and Kubik 2016; De Waal et al 2013; Koposov 2017; Lewis 2020; Mendelson and Gerber 2006; Sullivan 2013; Riabchuk 2016). Over the past twenty years, Russian President Vladimir Putin has revitalized hero/liberator narratives of Stalin’s role in the “Great Patriotic War” to stimulate Russian nationalism and pride, which has led to a rehabilitation of Stalin’s image and significance among many Russians (Edele 2017; Gugushvili and Peter 2019; Kratochvíl and Shakhanova 2020; Nelson 2015; Vujacic 2007; Wood 2011; Reese 2018).…”

The Coverage of the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict by the Polish Media (2014-2015)

“…The conflict is also defined as an inter-state dispute. Baluk and Doroszko (2017), Bebler (2014) and Riabchuk (2016) are some of the scholars that have used this definition and called it the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.…”

From Social Chronotope to Political Myth: Ukrainian Case

“…Проблематике Украины, украинского транзита, «Оранжевой революции», Евромайдана посвящена обширная литература [Мироненко 2020]; анализу подвергаются не только причины и последствия этих событий, изменение расстановки политических сил, но и вопросы украинской идентичности, ее идеологического и психологического измерения [Shulman 2004;Riabchuk 2016;Kulyk 2016, Zaharchenko 2012]. Специальное исследование посвящено анализу дискурсивного пространства Евромайдана, созданию новых смыслов и идейно-ценностных демаркаций [Байша 2021].…”