Unable or Unwilling to Exercise Self-control? The Impact of Neuroscience on Perceptions of Impulsive Offenders

Abstract

In growing numbers of court cases, neuroscience is presented to document the mental state of the offender at the level of the brain. While a small body of research has documented the effects of describing the brain state of psychotic offenders, this study tested the impact of neuroscience that could apply to far more offenders; that is the neuroscience of impulse control. In this online vignette experiment, 759 participants sentenced a normally controlled or normally impulsive actor, who committed a violent offense on impulse, explained in either cognitive or neurobiological terms. Although participants considered the neurobiological actor less responsible for his impulsive disposition than the cognitive actor, the neuroscientific testimony did not affect attributions of choice, blame, dangerousness, or punishment for the criminal act. In fact, the neuroscientific testimony exacerbated the perception that the offender offended consciously and “really wanted” to offend. The described disposition of the actor was also influential: participants attributed more capacity for reform, more free choice and consequently, more blame to the normally controlled actor. Participants also attributed this actor's offending more to his social life experiences and less to his genes and brain. However, this shift in attributions was unable to explain the greater blame directed at this offender. Together, such findings suggest that even when neuroscience changes attributions for impulsive character, attributions for impulsive offending may remain unchanged. Hence this study casts doubt on the mitigating and aggravating potential of neuroscientific testimony in court.

Reconciling the opposing effects of neurobiological evidence on criminal sentencing judgments

“…For example, neurobiological evidence of psychopathic or anti-social tendencies in criminal offenders had no effect on participant’s recommended prison sentence lengths compared to psychological or behavioral evidence [22, 23]. Similarly, Blakey and Kremsmayer [24] found that describing a case of aggravated assault as stemming from the offender’s impaired brain activity as opposed to his lower self-control had no significant impact on the length of prison sentence recommended for the crime. Finally, Schweitzer, Saks, Murphy, Roskies, Sinnott-Armstrong, and Gaudet [25] found that after conducting four experiments investigating the effects of neurobiological evidence on criminal sentencing, a meta-analysis demonstrated no effect of neurobiological evidence on guilt verdicts.…”

The effect of neuroscientific evidence on sentencing depends on how one conceives of reasons for incarceration

“…Eight hundred and two U.S. adults completed the study. In accordance with much of the previous work in this area (e.g., [ 14 , 24 , 27 ]), the present study used lay samples to render sentencing recommendations, although in the real world sentencing typically falls to judges.…”

Autonomy and the folk concept of valid consent

“…Previous work has shown that a central component of moral responsibility is the agent's ability to choose, which is determined in part by the possession of cognitive and psychological capacities for rational decision-making (Alicke, 2000;Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014;Schlenker et al, 1994;Shaver, 1985;Weiner, 1995). Accordingly, lacking autonomous decision-making capacities reduces judgments that an agent is morally responsible (Blakey & Kremsmayer, 2018;Daigle & Demaree-Cotton, 2021;Monroe, Brady & Malle, 2017, Study 4;Rise & Halkjelsvik 2019). Similar patterns are seen in lay judgments of criminal responsibility (e.g.…”

“…Relevant cues could include age, mental illness, developmental disability, intoxication, history of trauma or abuse, the consenter's past behaviors, displays of emotion or pain, or social group stereotypes (e.g. Blakey & Kremsmayer, 2018;Vonasch, Baumeister, & Mele, 2018). Future research could further investigate which kinds of real-life circumstances are regarded as autonomy-and consent-undermining.…”