Abstract. We propose the use of the angel-daemon framework to assess the Coleman's power of a collectivity to act under uncertainty in weighted voting games. First, we introduce a perturbation strength model describing the potential changes in the weights of a weighted game. Based on S, an uncertainty profile U, fixes the spread of the weights' change. In the angel-daemon framework uncertainty profiles describe the potential changes in the weights of a weighted game and fixes the spread of the weights' change. For each uncertainty profile a strategic a/d game can be considered. The game has two selfish players, the angel a and the daemon d, a selects their action as to minimize the effect on the measure under consideration while d acts oppositely. Players a and d give a balance between the best and the the best and the worst. The a/d games associated to the Coleman's power are constant sum games and therefore the expected utilities of all the Nash equilibria in the a/d associated to an uncertainty profile are the same. In this way we can asses the Coleman's power under uncertainty. Besides introducing the framework for this particular setting and analyzing some computational complexity considerations we provide several examples based in the evolution of the voting rules of the EU Council of Ministers.