Uncoercible e-Bidding Games

Burmester, Mike; Magkos, Emmanouil; Chrissikopoulos, Vassilios

doi:10.1023/b:elec.0000009284.64158.0a

Cited by 9 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Earlier work on multi-item auctions either assumes distributed trust [14,36,1], or adopts multi-party computation techniques [5], and the current state of the art for secure combinatorial auctions is still not very scalable [37,35]. One practical issue, addressed in previous work but not here, is that of noncoercibility [7,34] of an auction. Noncoercibility prevents a bidder from being able to credibly claim to a third party that it bid in a particular way after the close of an auction.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…This assumption is related to the widely accepted RSA assumption underlying the security of RSA encryption and is believed to be of similar strength. 7 We further assume that the cryptographic hash function used for commitments preserves the security of the encrypted bids. See Section 2.4.2 for a detailed description of such hash functions.…”

Section: Preliminaries 21 Desired Auction Propertiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions

Parkes

Rabin

Shieber

et al. 2008

Electronic Commerce Research and Applications

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We present a practical system for conducting sealed-bid auctions that preserves the secrecy of the bids while providing for verifiable correctness and trustworthiness of the auction. The auctioneer must accept all bids submitted and follow the published rules of the auction. No party receives any useful information about bids before the auction closes and no bidder is able to change or repudiate her 1 bid. Our solution uses Paillier's homomorphic encryption scheme [25] for zero knowledge proofs of correctness. Only minimal cryptographic technology is required of bidders; instead of employing complex interactive protocols or multi-party computation, the single auctioneer computes optimal auction results and publishes proofs of the results' correctness. Any party can check these proofs of correctness via publicly verifiable computations on encrypted bids. The system is illustrated through application to firstprice, uniform-price and second-price auctions, including multiitem auctions. Our empirical results demonstrate the practicality of our method: auctions with hundreds of bidders are within reach of a single PC, while a modest distributed computing network can accommodate auctions with thousands of bids.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Preliminaries 21 Desired Auction Propertiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions

Parkes

Rabin

Shieber

et al. 2008

Electronic Commerce Research and Applications

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show abstract

“…The receipt-free incoercible protocols in [2,5,13,14,16] were based on two physical assumptions: bulletin/bidding booth and untappable channel. It is understood that without the untappable channel, uncoercibility can not be guaranteed.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This simple defect enables some serious problems like vote selling and coercing. The problem was further studied in different electronic election literatures [2,3,14] and also in electronic sealed-bid auction literatures [4,5,13,14,16]. In this paper auction means sealed bid auction.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Uncoercibility In E-Voting And E-Auctioning Mechanisms Using Deniable Encryption

Howlader¹,

Nair²,

Basu³

et al. 2011

IJNSA

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Sealed‐bid auction: a cryptographic solution to bid‐rigging attack in the collusive environment

Howlader

Mal

2015

Security Comm Networks

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Sealed‐Bid auction is an efficient and rational way to establish the price and trading goods in the open market. However sealed‐bid auctions are subject to bid‐rigging attack. Receipt‐free mechanisms are proposed to prevent bid‐rigging. So far, all the proposed receipt‐free mechanisms are based on strict assumptions: i) The channel between bidders and the auction authorities (like auctioneer, sealer, registering authority etc.) must be untappable, 2) the authorities are assumed to be honest (not colluded), hence ensure privacy and anonymity of bids. Moreover, the existing receipt‐free mechanisms are bandwidth intensive (estimated difference between the minimum and maximum bidding price). In this paper, we present a receipt‐free sealed‐bid auction mechanism which can withstand public channel and colluded authorities. The proposed mechanism can work even under the situation where all the authorities except one are colluded. Unlike the existing mechanisms, the computational complexity of the proposed mechanism is independent of the bandwidth and only depends on the number of valid bids. The auction mechanism requires O(mlogm) computational steps to resolve the winner, where m is the number of valid bids in the system. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Uncoercible e-Bidding Games

Cited by 9 publications

References 23 publications

Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions

Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions

Uncoercibility In E-Voting And E-Auctioning Mechanisms Using Deniable Encryption

Sealed‐bid auction: a cryptographic solution to bid‐rigging attack in the collusive environment

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