Unconscious Perception and Unconscious Bias

Abstract

The possibilities of unconscious perception and unconscious bias prompt parallel debates about unconscious mental content. This chapter argues that claims within these debates alleging the existence of unconscious content are made fraught by ambiguity and confusion with respect to the two central concepts they involve: consciousness and content. Borrowing conceptual resources from the debate about unconscious perception, the chapter distills the two conceptual puzzles concerning each of these notions and establishes philosophical strategies for their resolution. It then argues that empirical evidence for unconscious bias falls victim to these same puzzles, but that progress can be made by adopting similar philosophical strategies. Throughout, the chapter highlights paths forward in both debates, illustrates how they serve as fruitful domains in which to study the relationship between philosophy and empirical science, and uses their combined study to further understanding of a general theory of unconscious content.

Varieties of Bias

“…In the functional framework of bias, as presented and supported by Johnson (2020a, 2020b, 2023a, 2023b), social bias functions like these other psychological and computational biases. Specifically, social bias is a functionally‐defined mental entity that takes structured mental states as inputs and yields structured mental states as outputs in ways that mimic inductions made on the basis of social‐group membership 12.…”

“…Indeed, we get things wrong exactly in cases where the environment is abnormal, like an image cleverly disguised to exploit our tacit assumptions, leading to visual illusions. 10 In the functional framework of bias, as presented and supported by Johnson (2020aJohnson ( , 2020bJohnson ( , 2023aJohnson ( , 2023b, social bias functions like these other psychological and computational biases. Specifically, social bias is a functionally-defined mental entity that takes structured mental states as inputs and yields structured mental states as outputs in ways that mimic inductions made on the basis of social-group membership.…”

“…This fits well with claims about the heterogeneity of (implicit) bias, seeHolroyd and Sweetman (2016), and views on which the content of bias is indeterminate, seeMadva (2017).28 For a broad sampling of empirical and philosophical approaches to implicit bias, seeBanaji and Greenwald (2013),Dovidio et al (2005),Gaertner and Dovidio (1986),Fazio (1990),Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006);Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2014) on the one hand; andHolroyd et al (2017), Del Pinal andSpaulding (2018),Levy (2015),Mandelbaum (2015),Machery (2016), Soon (2019,Welpinghus (2019),Sullivan-Bissett (2019),Nanay (2021),Karlan (2021),Toribio (2021) on the other.29 This example comes originally fromDennett (1981, p. 107). SeeJohnson (2023b) for a comprehensive exploration of how different views about the structure of bias can intersect in interesting ways with questions of conscious accessibility.30 For canonical work on psychological essentialism, seeRothbart and Taylor (1992);Gelman (2004). For empirical work suggesting that social kinds are psychologically essentialized, seeHaslam et al (2000),Rhodes and Mandalaywala (2017);Pauker et al (2010).…”

“…29 29 This example comes originally from Dennett (1981, p. 107). See Johnson (2023b) for a comprehensive exploration of how different views about the structure of bias can intersect in interesting ways with questions of conscious accessibility. …”