2022
DOI: 10.18651/rwp2022-15
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Unconventional Monetary Policy and Local Fiscal Policy

Abstract: Following the onset of the pandemic, the Federal Reserve employed an unconventional monetary policy that directly intervened in municipal bond markets. We characterize the fiscal and macroeconomic implications of such central bank actions in a New Keynesian model of a monetary union. We assume that state and local governments are subject to a loan-in-advance constraint, reflecting that with lumpy cash flows, they often finance a fraction of expenditures by issuing short-term bonds. The municipal debt is held b… Show more

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“…With the exception of perhaps China, central banks do not hold large amounts of assets in the longer-run [19] Ultimately, governments still hold the bag when a central bank goes broke – so all monetary policy is in some sense fiscal policy (Buiter, 2008). Yet, when the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) provides credit to banks and directs these banks to loan to particular enterprises, such an arrangement is the same as if the central bank lent directly (Li, 2013). For example, under the PBOC’s Pledged Supplementary Lending Scheme, the China Development Bank (the only institution eligible for the Scheme) received 1 trillion RBM from the central bank for urban development lending (Le et al ., 2014, at box 1).…”
Section: Structural Macro Disequilibriamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…With the exception of perhaps China, central banks do not hold large amounts of assets in the longer-run [19] Ultimately, governments still hold the bag when a central bank goes broke – so all monetary policy is in some sense fiscal policy (Buiter, 2008). Yet, when the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) provides credit to banks and directs these banks to loan to particular enterprises, such an arrangement is the same as if the central bank lent directly (Li, 2013). For example, under the PBOC’s Pledged Supplementary Lending Scheme, the China Development Bank (the only institution eligible for the Scheme) received 1 trillion RBM from the central bank for urban development lending (Le et al ., 2014, at box 1).…”
Section: Structural Macro Disequilibriamentioning
confidence: 99%