Understanding and managing behavioural risks: the case of malpractice in poultry production

Hirschauer, Norbert; Zwoll, Stefan

doi:10.1007/s10657-008-9051-0

Cited by 23 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 82 publications

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“…The empirical literature on agri‐food labelling, which is plentiful, is mostly focused on label use and other consumer‐related aspects of labelling (see, in the context of nutritional labels, the reviews by Drichoutis et al (2011) and Kiesel et al (2011)). The few empirical analyses focusing on agri‐food fraud investigated fraudsters' behaviour (Hirschauer and Zwoll 2008; Gambelli et al 2014; Lippert et al 2014) and how fraud incidents affect consumer food choices (Yamoah and Yawson 2014; Agnoli et al 2016). Hirschauer and Zwoll (2008) used a principal‐agent model to explain fraudulent behaviour in the poultry sector and to determine the optimal level of fines offsetting illegally gained profits.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The few empirical analyses focusing on agri‐food fraud investigated fraudsters' behaviour (Hirschauer and Zwoll 2008; Gambelli et al 2014; Lippert et al 2014) and how fraud incidents affect consumer food choices (Yamoah and Yawson 2014; Agnoli et al 2016). Hirschauer and Zwoll (2008) used a principal‐agent model to explain fraudulent behaviour in the poultry sector and to determine the optimal level of fines offsetting illegally gained profits. Lippert et al (2014) presented an econometric model to investigate non‐compliance among organic farmers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An empirical framework to study food labelling fraud: an application to the Italian extra‐virgin olive oil market

Bimbo

Bonanno

Viscecchia

2019

Aus J Agri & Res Econ

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The mislabelling of agricultural and food products is one of the most common types of food fraud. Despite the frequency with which labelling fraud occurs, there is no empirical framework to study its welfare implications, the probability that it may occur, and the measures that can limit its occurrence. We present an empirical framework to study the economic consequences of food labelling fraud in a differentiated products food market. Such framework requires the availability of sales data and the use of an 'attribute-space' demand model. The model is applied to the Italian extra-virgin olive oil market to simulate the occurrence of fraudulent '100 per cent Italian' claims. Our results indicate that potential consumer losses due to overpayments for a false claim are higher than manufacturer gains, suggesting that labelling fraud results in welfare losses and not just in welfare transfers. Simulation results indicate that the level of the current administrative fines is not likely to be effective to discourage '100 per cent Italian' labelling fraud. Imposing larger fines or other measures negatively affecting a firm's image could be more effective in deterring labelling fraud.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An empirical framework to study food labelling fraud: an application to the Italian extra‐virgin olive oil market

Bimbo

Bonanno

Viscecchia

2019

Aus J Agri & Res Econ

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“…The nudges may have triggered such a reaction and produced a perverse effect within the 4 group of deviant participants who may have felt that "illegitimate" means had been used to urge them 5 to comply with "illegitimate" rules they did not accept in the first place (missing value correspondence 6 between regulators and regulates; cf. Hirschauer and Zwoll, 2008). In other words, especially the 7 "high-intensity" nudge B may have instigated non-responsive participants to break the rules in order to 8 reclaim what they considered their legitimate freedom of action.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nudging Farmers to Comply With Water Protection Rules – Experimental Evidence From Germany

Peth

Mußhoff

Funke

et al. 2018

Ecological Economics

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Nitrogen runoffs induced by agricultural fertilisation cause serious environmental damage to surface waters. Environmental and consumer protectionists demand government intervention to mitigate these externalities. With this in mind, the present study examines the effects of nudge-based regulatory strategies. We use an incentivised single-player multi-period business management game as an experimental device to study how nudges affect compliance with the minimum-distance-to-water rule in a sample of German farmers. We investigate two different nudge treatments: a nudge with information and pictures showing environmental and health damages that are presumably caused by breaching the minimum-distance-towater rule, and a nudge with an additional social comparison suggesting that the majority of farmers in the same region comply with the rule. We observe three core experimental outcomes: first, nudging has a preventive effect and reduces the share of non-compliant participants. Second, against all expectations, the preventive effect of the nudge with an additional social comparison is weaker than that of the nudge with information and pictures alone. Third, despite the overall positive effects of nudging, the nudge with social comparison even increased the severity of non-complying behaviour in the deviant subpopulation. Abstract 4Nitrogen runoffs induced by agricultural fertilisation cause serious environmental damage to surface 5 waters. Environmental and consumer protectionists demand government intervention to mitigate these 6 externalities. With this in mind, the present study examines the effects of nudge-based regulatory 7 strategies. We use an incentivised single-player multi-period business management game as an 8 experimental device to study how nudges affect compliance with the minimum-distance-to-water rule 9 in a sample of German farmers. We investigate two different nudge treatments: a nudge with 10 information and pictures showing environmental and health damages that are presumably caused by 11 breaching the minimum-distance-to-water rule, and a nudge with an additional social comparison 12 suggesting that the majority of farmers in the same region comply with the rule. We observe three core 13 experimental outcomes: first, nudging has a preventive effect and reduces the share of non-compliant 14 participants. Second, against all expectations, the preventive effect of the nudge with an additional 15 social comparison is weaker than that of the nudge with information and pictures alone. Third, despite 16 the overall positive effects of nudging, the nudge with social comparison even increased the severity 17 of non-complying behaviour in the deviant subpopulation. 18 Key Words 19Green nudge, behavioural economics, business management games, ex-ante policy impact analysis 20 JEL Classifications 21 Q18, Q28, Q53, Q58, D91 22

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“…To do so, however, it is important to understand frauds’ incentives. Hirschauer and Zwoll () use a principal‐agent model to determine optimal fine levels or fines that will offset a firm’s illegal profits from frauds. Others have investigated factors affecting organic farmers’ non‐compliance decisions (e.g., Lippert et al ; Gambelli et al ) and factors affecting farmers’ tolerance of unethical behaviour (Hendrickson and James , ).…”

Section: Consumer and Societal Food Fraud Costsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Food fraud: economic insights into the dark side of incentives

Ehmke

Bonanno

Boys

et al. 2019

Aus J Agri & Res Econ

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In this review, we contextualise the articles in this special issue, relating them to existing food fraud research, and identify food fraud research trends, challenges and priorities for the near term. We accomplish these aims through a comprehensive review of research by food scientists, economists, other social scientists, legal experts, government research groups and international trade organisations. Existing food fraud research is heavily weighted towards food science, packaging and labelling, and legal areas of knowledge discovery. Moving forward, research is needed pertaining to general economic welfare outcomes from food fraud incidences, economic incentives to deter frauds, economic spillovers from fraud incidences to other food products and markets (domestic and international) and further delineation of the effect of different types of food fraud on consumer and producer welfare. The articles in this special issue make significant contributions to understanding of the role of food fraud in consumer decisions, measuring consumer welfare losses from fraud, food fraud spillover effects to other markets and new frameworks for fraud analysis.

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Understanding and managing behavioural risks: the case of malpractice in poultry production

Abstract: Asymmetric information, Behavioural economic analysis, Control theories, Economic misconduct, Moral hazard, Protective factors, A13, K32, K42,

Cited by 23 publications

References 82 publications

An empirical framework to study food labelling fraud: an application to the Italian extra‐virgin olive oil market

An empirical framework to study food labelling fraud: an application to the Italian extra‐virgin olive oil market

Nudging Farmers to Comply With Water Protection Rules – Experimental Evidence From Germany

Food fraud: economic insights into the dark side of incentives

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