Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition

Abstract

We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.

Gaze allocation in a dynamic situation: Effects of social status and speaking

“…Evidence suggests, however, that the ability to share others' goals and intentions (i.e., theory of mind) is fundamentally linked to orienting to another's gaze (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). For example, evidence from individuals with autism (Baron-Cohen, 1995), psychopathy (Dadds, El Masry, Wimalaweera, & Guastella, 2008), and patients with selective damage to the amygdala (Adolphs et al, 2005), confirms that deficits in processing emotion and theory of mind are often accompanied by a reduced tendency to look at the eyes.…”

Empirical approaches to the study of language evolution

“…Perhaps because of the unique nature of human language, language seems to intuitively invite Bsingle cause^thinking, where some particular trait is singled out as Bthe key^to language and by extension to human uniqueness. Depending on the scholar, this favored trait may be speech (Lieberman, 1984(Lieberman, , 2006, syntax (Berwick & Chomsky, 2016;Chomsky, 2010), or shared intentionality (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005), but in each case one factor is emphasized and other relevant factors are downplayed. I believe that this widespread tendency toward monolithic thinking about language is one of the root causes of dissent in the study of language evolution, since once a particular factor has been chosen, other factors (and other scholars' thinking) appear to be irrelevant.…”

Towards a unified science of cultural evolution

“…Knudsen & Hodgson similarly argue that we "fail to elaborate on key differences between human and nonhuman culture, where the former involves a developed abstract language and capacities to attribute intentions and meanings." Although the widespread use of symbolic language does seem to be specific to humans, a capacity to use symbols and attribute intentions and meanings is to some extent shared with other species (Tomasello et al 2005). Indeed, one of the benefits of the evolutionary approach that we advocate is the use of the comparative method, where the approaches outlined in section 5 can be used to identify homologous or convergent cognitive adaptations in other species that may underpin the biologically evolved capacity for culture in humans.…”