Understanding human agency

Mayr, Erasmus

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606214.003.0012

Cited by 20 publications

(23 citation statements)

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“…We view powers as properties of agents. We are aware that the literature has adopted a more general use of the term, where powers are properties of physical objects in general; being ascribed to agents, trees and stones alike (see e.g., Mayr 2011 ). We believe our use of the term ‘power’ as an agentive property is closer to common natural language use; we feel it is somewhat odd to talk of the powers of stones, since inanimate objects like stones do not act .…”

Section: Power and Opportunitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Agents necessitating effects in newtonian time and space: from power and opportunity to effectivity

Broersen

2018

Synthese

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We extend stit logic by adding a spatial dimension. This enables us to distinguish between powers and opportunities of agents. Powers are agent-specific and do not depend on an agent's location. Opportunities do depend on locations, and are the same for every agent. The central idea is to define the real possibility to see to the truth of a condition in space and time as the combination of the power and the opportunity to do so. The focus on agent-relative powers and space-relative opportunities firmly roots effectivity of an autonomous choice making agent in a spacetime picture. Our space-time view will be classically Newtonian, since we will assume relativistic phenomena do not play a role in agentive effectivity. We show how our semantics naturally distinguishes between different kinds of histories; histories that reflect real (factual) possibilities and histories that reflect counterfactual possibilities (of a particular hypothetical kind). Furthermore, we discuss how the spatial picture sheds light on conceptual problems plaguing the central stit property of 'independence of agency'. At several points in the article we will emphasise and defend the differences with Belnap's theory of agency in relativistic branching space-times.

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Section: Power and Opportunitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Mayr ( 2011 ) mentions as an example of a second order power “to become brittle when heated” (the first order power is here “having the power to break”). But as we mentioned before, this assumes a more general interpretation of powers than ours.…”

Section: Power and Opportunitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Agents necessitating effects in newtonian time and space: from power and opportunity to effectivity

Broersen

2018

Synthese

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“…The disadvantage of focusing on O'Connor's work is that he is only interested in defending an agent-causal theory of libertarian free agency. Other recent defenses of agent-causalism, such asAlvarez and Hyman (1998),Brent (2012), andMayr (2011) are offered in support of agent-causal theories of action. Still, a critique of O'Connor's work has implications for other similar defenses of the metaphysics of agency more generally.…”

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confidence: 96%

“…For agent-causal theories, seeAlvarez and Hyman (1998),Brent (2012),Mayr (2011),O'Connor (2000O'Connor ( , 2009aO'Connor ( , 2009b. For dispositionalist compatibilist theories, seeFara (2008), Smith (1997, and Vihvelin (2004) Clarke (2009),Cohen and Handfield (2007),.…”

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How Does Agent-Causal Power Work?

Buckareff¹

2011

The Modern Schoolman

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Agent-causalism or the agency theory is the thesis that agents qua objects/substances cause at least some of their decisions (or at least their coming to have an intention that is constitutive of a decision). In this paper, I examine the tenability of an attractive agentcausal account of the metaphysics of the springs of free action developed and defended in the recent work of Timothy O'Connor. Against the backdrop of recent work on causal powers in ontology, I argue that, however attractive the account, O'Connor's agent-causal theory of free agency is ultimately untenable. 3 I agree, however, with John Bishop (1989) that agent-causation is conceptually irreducible. (Like me, Bishop argues that agent-causation is ontologically reducible, but for reasons different from those offered in this paper.) So my goal here, like Bishop's, is not to offer a conceptual or linguistic analysis of 'agent-causation.' Rather, I wish to examine what agent-causation is.

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Are abilities dispositions?

Vetter

2016

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Understanding human agency

Cited by 20 publications

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Agents necessitating effects in newtonian time and space: from power and opportunity to effectivity

Agents necessitating effects in newtonian time and space: from power and opportunity to effectivity

How Does Agent-Causal Power Work?

Are abilities dispositions?

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