2017
DOI: 10.1142/10427
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Understanding Singapore Politics

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Cited by 6 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…17 This regular turnover empowers the CEC and allows it to remove lacklustre or dissenting MPs, similar to the CPC which also recruits horizontally and experiences frequent turnover (Xie and Zhang, 2017). However, unlike the CPC’s turnover that is triggered by its formal retirement age of sixty-five (Wang and Vangeli, 2016), the PAP’s turnover is legitimised by its regular elections every four to five years and rhetoric for leadership renewal (Singh, 2017: 78). The PAP’s turnover promotes party loyalty because it (1) reminds MPs of the party hierarchy and more specifically that the party selectorate retains the right to nominate and select its candidates; (2) emphasises the continued need for loyalty and performance in order to ensure re-election; and (3) ties MP positions to the party and not local constituency support.…”
Section: Centralised Candidate Selection Turnover and Cohesionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…17 This regular turnover empowers the CEC and allows it to remove lacklustre or dissenting MPs, similar to the CPC which also recruits horizontally and experiences frequent turnover (Xie and Zhang, 2017). However, unlike the CPC’s turnover that is triggered by its formal retirement age of sixty-five (Wang and Vangeli, 2016), the PAP’s turnover is legitimised by its regular elections every four to five years and rhetoric for leadership renewal (Singh, 2017: 78). The PAP’s turnover promotes party loyalty because it (1) reminds MPs of the party hierarchy and more specifically that the party selectorate retains the right to nominate and select its candidates; (2) emphasises the continued need for loyalty and performance in order to ensure re-election; and (3) ties MP positions to the party and not local constituency support.…”
Section: Centralised Candidate Selection Turnover and Cohesionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The bureaucracy has been shaped in the image of the ruling party, wielding its influence only as an arm of the party, unlike in countries where the ruling party alternates between two or more entities. In fact, many PAP leaders themselves came from the bureaucracy; the latter has always been seen as a useful breeding ground for aspiring politicians (Singh, 2017). The bureaucracy thus has a smooth relationship with the government, and the messaging from the ruling party rarely, if ever, differs from that of the bureaucratic machinery.…”
Section: Pap and The Bureaucracymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In Singapore, competitive elections have allowed the PAP to achieve a high level of trust and legitimacy (Mutalib 2002;Tan 2013Tan , 2014Singh 2017), with the "normative and symbolic value of elections" serving to establish moral grounds for policy compliance (Morgenbesser 2017). This is reflected in the Edelman Trust Barometer, which finds public trust in the Singaporean government to have risen over the years to its current level of 70%.…”
Section: Legitimation Capacitymentioning
confidence: 99%