Understanding the Adaptive Functions of Morality from a Cognitive Psychological Perspective

Abstract

What are the possible functions of moral cognition? Addressing this question has proven difficult, leading to disagreement among moral psychologists. Researchers claiming that morality is composed of many distinct domains have posited multiple functions, whereas researchers focusing on the features that are unique to and common across all moral judgments have suggested a unified evolutionary function. In this review, we suggest that the limitations of these accounts can be overcome by systematically investigating the cognitive mechanisms that support moral judgments across descriptively distinct domains. As a case study, we focus on the contrast between harm and purity morals, and we argue for a novel functional difference on the basis of differences in the underlying psychological processes. Understanding the psychology behind distinct morals will pave the way for understanding the distinct functions of moral cognition.

Illuminating the conceptual structure of the space of moral violations with searchlight representational similarity analysis

“…Our results do not answer whether purity violations are considered immoral because they are disgusting, as posited by theories of purity-based moral values as a disease-avoidance mechanism (Curtis et al, 2011). They do, however, support the claim that disgust is a key organizational axis within the moral space, by which gross and immoral acts (e.g., sex with a sibling) are separated from immoral but not-gross acts (Dungan and Young, 2015) – a claim further supported by our behavioral results showing that disgust drives organization of violations along the first principal component (Fig. 3).…”

The relevance of moral norms in distinct relational contexts: Purity versus harm norms regulate self-directed actions

“…Intriguingly, while there is little empirical work on the cognitive inputs to judgments of loyalty, hierarchy, and fairness violations, judgments of binding versus individualizing norms may reflect the same cognitive differences observed between purity and harm violations; in particular, the greater role of outcomes relative to other contextual features [ 62 – 64 ]. Future research should test whether judgments of other moral domains also track with concerns for different relational contexts, as outlined here [ 65 ]. Doing so will provide a more detailed characterization of moral judgments and may inform current theories on the adaptive functions of distinct moral norms.…”

The Dark Side of Morality: Prioritizing Sanctity Over Care Motivates Denial of Mind and Prejudice Toward Sexual Out-Groups (Monroe & Plant, in press)

“…However, across and within cultures, people disagree about whether these values are moral or matters of social convention (Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987); people clash over which values ought to take precedence over others (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009;, or whether multiple moral values exist at all (Schein & Gray, 2017). Disagreements over how to carve up the moral domain have been linked to everyday decisions about sharing, reciprocity, and deception (Dungan, Waytz, & Young, 2014;Dungan & Young, 2015;Waytz, Dungan, & Young, 2013), as well as people's attitudes about hot-button issues (e.g., suicide; Rottman, Kelemen, & Young, 2014) and "culture war" disputes (e.g., gay rights, abortion, flag burning; Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012).…”