Understanding the Determination of Severance Pay: Mandates, Bargaining, and Unions*

Auray, Stéphane; Danthine, Samuel; Poschke, Markus

doi:10.1111/sjoe.12367

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 46 publications

(96 reference statements)

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“…When facing furloughs or layoffs, unionized employers offer better terms and conditions of employment, such as better severance packages (Holzmann, Pouget, Vodopivec, & Weber, 2012; Auray et al., 2020). Even though severance pay is not required by the Fair Labor Standards Act in the United States, most employers tend to offer them as gestures of goodwill or to remain competitive in the labour market.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

What did unions do for union workers during the COVID‐19 pandemic?

Han

2022

Brit J Industrial Rel

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This research examines the impact of the COVID‐19 pandemic on labour market outcomes of union workers, based on nationally representative data. I employ the difference‐in‐difference estimation to identify the effect of the COVID‐19 pandemic on the employment, labour earnings and other labour market outcomes of union workers, relative to non‐union workers. I find that, compared to non‐union workers, union workers experienced greater job security, and the pre‐pandemic union wage premium remained largely unchanged during the pandemic. There exists a large heterogeneity in the union effect on employment and real wages by worker characteristic. I also find that union workers, compared to non‐union workers, were less likely to work remotely but more likely to receive pay for hours not worked due to COVID‐19. The results suggest that unions provided workers with employment stability and an economic buffer during the pandemic‐led recession.

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Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

What did unions do for union workers during the COVID‐19 pandemic?

Han

2022

Brit J Industrial Rel

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“…When facing furloughs or layoffs, unionized employers offer better terms and conditions of employment, such as better severance packages (Auray et al, 2020; Holzmann et al, 2012). Even though severance pay is not required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in the US, most employers tend to offer them as gestures of goodwill or to remain competitive in the labor market.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

How did theCOVID‐19 pandemic affect men's and women's returns to unionization?

Han

2023

Industrial Relations

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Using data from the Current Population Survey for the period 2015 to 2021, I study union‐nonunion differences in employment, wages and other terms and conditions before and after the COVID‐19 pandemic. Analyses are run separately for men and women. I find that, compared to non‐union workers, union workers were better able to retain employment, less likely to do telework, and more likely to receive pay for the hours they did not work during the pandemic. These patterns were more evident for female workers.

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“… Auray, Danthine, and Poschke () provided some data about the determination of mandated and bargained severance pay in continental European countries. …”

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confidence: 99%

Eligibility, experience rating, and unemployment insurance take‐up

Auray

Fuller

2020

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In this paper, we investigate the causes and consequences of “unclaimed” unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. A search model is developed where the costs to collecting UI benefits include both a traditional “fixed” administrative cost and an endogenous cost arising from worker and firm interactions. Experience rated taxes give firms an incentive to challenge a worker's UI claim, and these challenges are costly for the worker. Exploiting data on improper denials of UI benefits across states in the U.S. system, a two‐way fixed effects analysis shows a statistically significant negative relationship between the improper denials and the UI take‐up rate, providing empirical support for our model. We calibrate the model to elasticities implied by the two‐way fixed effects regression to quantify the relative size of these UI collection costs. The results imply that on average the costs associated with firm challenges of UI claims account for 41% of the total costs of collecting, with improper denials accounting for 8% of the total cost. The endogenous collection costs imply the unemployment rate responds much slower to changes in UI benefits relative to a model with fixed collection costs. Finally, removing all eligibility requirements and allowing workers to collect UI benefits without cost shows these costs to be 4.5% of expected output net of vacancy costs. Moreover, this change has minimal impact on the unemployment rate.

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Understanding the Determination of Severance Pay: Mandates, Bargaining, and Unions*

Cited by 5 publications

References 46 publications

What did unions do for union workers during the COVID‐19 pandemic?

What did unions do for union workers during the COVID‐19 pandemic?

How did theCOVID‐19 pandemic affect men's and women's returns to unionization?

Eligibility, experience rating, and unemployment insurance take‐up

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