Background
Online healthcare platform (OHP) is a new form of medical treatment, which solves the problems of unbalanced distribution of medical resources and expensive medical treatment in China. Especially under the epidemic of COVID-19, OHP has greatly reduced the medical pressure of the hospital and the risk of cross infection.
Methods
This paper uses evolutionary game theory to analyze behavioral strategies and their dynamic evolution in the promotion of OHP, and then numerical simulations are carried out with the help of program compilation.
Results
The results demonstrate that: (1) both the stricter qualification inspection of doctors and the more investment in information protection promote the participation of doctors and the use of patients; (2) with a higher initial probability of doctors joining, the possibility for patients in using OHP and platforms to provide standardized online healthcare services becomes higher; (3) if the initial probability of patients using is higher, the possibility for doctors to participate OHP and platforms to provide standardized online healthcare services raises; (4) the trend of doctors joining the platform is affected by factors, such as registration cost, time cost, reputation loss and so on; (5) the tendency of patients in using online healthcare is mainly decided by the cost.
Conclusions
Based on theoretical analysis, this article takes the Spring Rain Doctor OHP as an example to verify the game results. Therefore, OHP should attach importance to the inspection of doctors and the protection of privacy information, and strengthen the publicity in remote places. At the same time OHP can promote the active participation of grassroots doctors, and set a reasonable evaluation mechanism, so as to popularize online medical treatment among patients further.