Understanding with theoretical models

Abstract

This paper discusses the epistemic import of highly abstract and simplified theoretical models using Thomas Schelling's checkerboard model as an example. We argue that the epistemic contribution of theoretical models can be better understood in the context of a cluster of models relevant to the explanatory task at hand. The central claim of the paper is that theoretical models make better sense in the context of the menu of possible explanations. In order to justify this claim, we introduce a distinction between causal scenarios and causal mechanism schemes.These conceptual tools help us to articulate the basis for modelers' intuitive confidence that their models make an important epistemic contribution. By focusing on the role of the menu of possible explanations in the evaluation of explanatory hypotheses, it is possible to understand how a causal mechanism scheme can improve our explanatory understanding even in cases where it does not describe the actual cause of a particular phenomenon. Highly abstract and simplified theoretical models have an important role in many sciences, for example, in evolutionary biology and economics. Although both scientists and philosophers have expressed doubts about the epistemic import of these idealized models, many scientists believe that they provide explanatory insight into real-world phenomena. Understanding the epistemic value of these abstract representations is one of the key challenges for philosophers of science who attempt to make sense of scientific modeling. In this paper we will examine ThomasSchelling's checkerboard model as an example of abstract theoretical models and articulate various ways in which it expands the social scientific understanding of segregation processes.We argue that the epistemic contribution of theoretical models can only be fully understood in the context of a cluster of models relevant to the explanatory task at hand. To disambiguate this claim, we introduce a distinction between two different cluster claims. The first, the family of models thesis, states that the epistemic value of theoretical models is not well understood if they are treated as isolated representations. It makes more sense when considered in the context of as a family of related models. Our second cluster claim, the competing causal mechanisms thesis, says that the full epistemic contribution of theoretical models can only be understood in the context of competing explanations for the same phenomenon. In other words, theoretical models make better sense in the context of the menu of possible explanations.The structure of the paper is as follows. In the first section, we start by making some observations about Schelling's famous checkerboard model and introduce our two cluster theses in the second section. In order to understand our second thesis, which brings up the contribution of the menu of possible explanations, it is necessary to understand the nature of how-possibly explanations (HPEs). Thus, in the third section, we introduce an enriched account of HPEs ...

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