Une politique de récompense dans la haute magistrature : le cas de la prime de rendement

Abstract

Cette étude montre comment l’introduction d’une prime de rendement dans la haute magistrature peut être entendue comme une politique de récompense. En promettant de mesurer la productivité, et de la sanctionner financièrement, le pouvoir politique cherche à « inciter » certains magistrats à travailler plus « rapidement » et plus « efficacement ». Ce mécanisme d’émulation repose sur une individualisation et une différenciation des magistrats. La logique de corps, basée sur l’éthos de la magistrature, est questionnée par cette technique issue du nouveau management public. La mise en concurrence des juges crée des dissensions et des distinctions au sein des juridictions. Elle rend possible l’exercice d’un pouvoir personnel par les responsables hiérarchiques. Cette enquête, conduite à partir d’entretiens semi-directifs, propose une analyse politique d’enjeux liés à la managérialisation de la justice.

Neither the Magic Bullet Nor the Big Bad Wolf: A Systematic Review of Frontline Judges’ Attitudes and Coping Regarding Managerialization

“…Pressures can also be exerted on judges' salaries. In France, for example, reforms to adjust judges' salaries according to performance, efficiency, and merit have been considered (Chelle, 2011). In Portugal, the salaries of frontline judges and other public officials are decreasing, while their workloads are increasing (Guimarães et al, 2017).…”

“…This explains the challenge of imposing NPM on the judicial system. The opposition to managerialization is also collective: in France, for example, magistrates’ unions (unsuccessfully) protested against a productivity bonus based on their “contribution to the operations of their services” and their “availability for their jurisdiction” (Chelle, 2011, p. 417).…”

“…Another concern is the impact of managerial reforms on the accessibility of justice (Chelle, 2011). Part of this concern is related to the centralization of frontline courts, which is meant to rationalize the costs; however, centralizing the Belgian justice of peace in the 1990s has been suspected to decrease judges’ understanding of the litigants and their knowledge of the field, while as far as citizens are concerned, it has increased the geographical distance of the courts and the subjective impression that judges are remote officials (Truffin, 2007).…”

“…Pressures induced by this output-oriented model of justice are documented by 15 (43%) of the reviewed articles. This can be achieved, for example, by quantifying and evaluating the work of judges (Guimarães et al, 2017; Lienhard & Kettiger, 2018), by setting up contracts of objectives (Jean, 2008) or by encouraging judges to work faster with performance incentives (Chelle, 2011). In the context of Italian frontline justice dealing with immigration issues, Dallara and Lacchei (2021), for example, report NPM-driven time constraints and increased pressure on individual performance among Italian frontline judges dealing with immigration issues.…”