1996
DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01499-3
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Unemployment duration, unemployment benefits, and labor market programs in Sweden

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Cited by 168 publications
(123 citation statements)
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“…1 Theory suggests that putting a limit on benefit duration will tend to accelerate job search and that benefit exhaustion will produce spike in escape rates Mortensen, 1977). The early empirical literature confirmed both predictions, namely, the reduction in escape rates/increase jobless duration with extended benefits (Katz and Meyer, 1990;Meyer, 1990) and the sharp increase in escape rates at benefit expiration (Katz and Meyer, 1990;Carling, Edin, Harkman, and Holmlund. 1996).…”
Section: Motivationsupporting
confidence: 50%
“…1 Theory suggests that putting a limit on benefit duration will tend to accelerate job search and that benefit exhaustion will produce spike in escape rates Mortensen, 1977). The early empirical literature confirmed both predictions, namely, the reduction in escape rates/increase jobless duration with extended benefits (Katz and Meyer, 1990;Meyer, 1990) and the sharp increase in escape rates at benefit expiration (Katz and Meyer, 1990;Carling, Edin, Harkman, and Holmlund. 1996).…”
Section: Motivationsupporting
confidence: 50%
“…Although this may indicate that joining may often be done purely in order to escape benefit exhaustion, it could still be the case that 34 E.g. Regnér (1997) provides some evidence that job-seekers may often enter labour market training just to renew benefits; Carling, Edin, Harkman and Holmlund (1996) show that UI-entitled individuals close to benefit exhaustion are significantly more likely to exit their unemployment spell to a program than those without unemployment compensation (cf. their Figure 3).…”
Section: Treatment Effects By Month Of Placement and Work-disincentivmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…19 Previous Swedish evidence on the importance of issues relating to unemployment benefits, work disincentive effects and cycling behaviour includes Ackum Agell, Björklund and Harkman (1995), Carling, Edin, Harkman and Holmlund (1996), Regnér (1997), Agell and Lundborg (1999), Carling, Holmlund and Vejsin (1999) and Hägglund (2000). However even after the typical 4-5 months duration of a programme, entitled participants do not seem to enjoy higher employment rates than if they had postponed their participation decision further.…”
Section: Programmes For Unemployed Adults: the Role Of Entitlement Stmentioning
confidence: 99%